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I. INTRODUCTION
This article concerns one of the major problems of criminal
procedure: the scope and effect of constitutional restrictions on
the interrogation of persons suspected of crime.
A woman has been viciously beaten and raped in a deserted
alley. Now, at the police station, she looks at "mug shots," but
she is unable to identify her assailant. She can give the police only
the most general description. He was probably under thirty, of
medium height and weight, and either a swarthy Caucasian or a
light-skinned Negro. The description is hardly enough to warrant
an arrest, but the police mechanism does not depend on such
technical concepts as probable cause. Within a few hours, four
men are taken into custody and booked "for investigation of rape."
Each lives in the vicinity of the crime; each fits the general
description; each has been convicted or suspected of rape or at-
tempted rape; and each, in his turn, will be interrogated.
The interrogation room is windowless. Windows in a police
station require bars; bars suggest imprisonment; and the thought
of imprisonment is a deterrent to confession. The room is bare of
distracting ornamentation and pictures; there is no telephone; there
are no small objects to finger in relief of tension; the absence of
ashtrays indicates that smoking is prohibited. The room is fur-
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nished with a desk and several straight-back chairs. The chairs
discourage slouching or leaning. They are placed close together.
The desk does not intrude between them. Interrogator and subject
will face each other man to man.
Adjoining the interrogation room is a room from which other
law-enforcement officers may observe the interrogation through a
two-way mirror. No friend or representative of the suspect will be
permitted in either the interrogation room or the observation room.
The interrogation concerns only the subject and his interrogator.
When the subject is brought into -the interrogation room, he finds
his interrogator in conservative civilian dress. The interrogator
displays neither pencil nor paper. He appears disinterested in taking
notes. He gives an impression of patience, an impression of having
an unlimited amount of time for the interrogation. Should the
subject ask to see an attorney, he may be met with the advice
that truth is cheap and that he can save an attorney's fee by
telling the truth. Should the subject decline to answer questions,
he may be informed that he has a privilege of silence, but that
silence carries an inference of guilt. The interrogation is already
under way.1 The interrogator's techniques are effective, and they
produce a confession. Because the confession contains an accurate
description of the victim and the scene of the crime, the case is
solved. Without the confession the case probably would not have
been solved. Precisely which techniques of interrogation were used
and how they produced a case-solving confession may be disputed
at the subject's trial. It is not unlikely that -the subject will claim
that he was beaten or that he was subjected to other impermissible
pressures or inducements. If the claims are made, they will be
denied by the interrogator.
Because confessions can be very important in the criminal
process and because interrogations are conducted in secret, it might
be expected that legislatures, the source of comprehensive codes of
substantive and procedural criminal law, would prescribe controls
for the police interrogation stage. Surprisingly, they have not done
so. It is true, of course, that in most states a person who is arrested
is entitled to a prompt preliminary hearing; 2 that in some states he
has a statutory right not to be held incommunicado; 3 and that in
1 The description of the interrogation room and the interrogator is found in
Inbau & Reid, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions 7-9, 13-16 (1962). The suggested
response to a request for counsel is found id. at 112. The parry to the thrust of
privilege is found id. at 111.
2 For a collection of the statutes, see La Fave, "Detention for Investigation by
the Police: An Analysis of Current Practices," 1962 Wash. U.L.Q. 331, 332-33.
8 Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 448 n. 4 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
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two jurisdictions he must be advised of his privilege of silence.4 But
with these exceptions, it has been correctly observed that "in the
Anglo-American law there is no regular provision for police exam-
ination of a person suspected of crime."5 In the face of legislative
silence, courts have attempted to resolve the problems of police
interrogation by creating certain exclusionary rules. Until January
1963, the significant restrictions were the McNabb-Mallory rule
at the federal level, and the coerced confessions rule 7 at both state
and federal levels. The McNabb-Mallory rule is unrelated to what
happened during the interrogation. At least in theory, its focal
point is the failure of the police to bring the arrestee before a magis-
trate without unreasonable delay. The confessions rule, however,
relates directly to what happened during the interrogation. Al-
though the question is said to be whether the confession was "vol-
untary,' 8 the rule has developed with an emphasis on opprobrious
police conduct.' The McNabb-Mallory rule, in its origin and
present application, is a rule of statutory interpretation. The con-
fessions rule, however, is a due process requirement, and, until
recently, it was regarded as the only federal constitutional restric-
tion on police interrogation."
In January 1963, in Wong Sun- v. United States," the Supreme
Court held inadmissible incriminating statements made shortly
4 This requirement is imposed in the military jurisdiction, U.C.MJ. art. 31(b),
10 U.S.C. § 831(b) (1959), and in Texas. Tex. Code Crim. P. art. 727 (Vernon
1941).
5 Paulsen, "The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree," 6 Stan. L. Rev.
411 (1954). It is also correct to observe that there is no general statutory regulation
of the admissibility of confessions. For exceptions, see U.C.M.J. art. 31(d), 10
U.S.C. § 831(d) (1959); Tex. Code Crim. P. arts. 726, 727 (Vernon 1941), both
dealing with improperly obtained confessions. In some states there is a statutory
requirement of proof of corpus delicti. See, for example, N.Y. Penal Law § 1041.
6 See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) ; McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (1943). The rule bars the admissibility of confessions obtained during
a detention in violation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a). For discussions of the rule, see
Hogan & Snee, "The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue," 47 Geo.
L. J. 1 (1958) ; Note, 68 Yale L. J. 1003 (1959).
7 See, for example, Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
8 Id. at 602.
9 Kamisar, "What is an 'Involuntary' Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and
Reid's 'Criminal Interrogation and Confessions,"' 17 Rutgers L. Rev. 728, 741, 747-55
(1963); Paulsen, supra note 5, at 429-35; Comment, 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 313, 317
(1964). But see Spanogle, "The Use of Coerced Confessions in State Courts," 17
Vand. L. Rev. 421 (1964), in which it is argued that the confessions rule makes
sense only if it is analysed in terms of compulsory self-incrimination.
10 See Mueller, "The Law Relating to Police Interrogation Privileges and
Limitations," in Police Power and Individual Freedom 131, 134-35 (Sowle ed. 1962).
"1 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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after an unconstitutional arrest. Thereby the Court suggested a
fourth-amendment restriction on police interrogation. Less than
five months later, in Haynes v. Washkington,'2 the Court held a
confession inadmissible because the police had refused "to allow
a suspect to call his wife until he confessed."' 3 Thereby the Court
changed the contour of the confessions rule. Before the effect of
these decisions could be felt, the Court added two new dimensions
to constitutional restrictions on police interrogation. In Massiak v.
United States14 and Malloy v. Hogan,5 respectively, the Court
held that the sixth-amendment right to counsel barred the admis-
sibility of a post-indictment confession obtained in the absence of
counsel, and that the fifth-amendment privilege against self-incrim-
ination applied to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Then, on the last day of the 1963 term,
came what may prove to be the most significant decision ever made
in the area of criminal procedure. In Escobedo v. Illinois,16 a
case in which most of the previous restrictions coalesced, the Court
held that the right to counsel extended to the police interrogation
stage of the criminal proceeding.
A preliminary assessment of the impact of all of these decisions,
but particularly of Escobedo, is the subject of this article. Develop-
ment of the problem in terms of a chronology of the cases would
put Wong Sun first. However, because the coerced confessions rule
has been the traditional constitutional limitation on police interro-
gation, and because many aspects of the recent decisions derive
from dissatisfaction with the operation of that rule, consideration
will first be given to the due process restriction barring the ad-
missibility of coerced confessions.
II. THE COERCED CONFESSIONs RULE
As developed by English courts, the confessions rule was de-
signed to increase the accuracy of the guilt-determining process by
excluding from evidence confessions obtained under pressure which,
as viewed retrospectively and unscientifically by judges, was suffi-
cient to create a fair risk of falsity. 7
12 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
'3 The quotation is from Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
14 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
'5 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
16 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
17 For a discussion of the history and scope of the confessions rule, see 3
Wigmore, Evidence §§ 815-20 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as 3 Wigmore]. The
operation of the rule is also considered in Maguire, Evidence, Common Sense and
Common Law 120-23 (1947) ; Maguire, "'Involuntary' Confessions," 31 Tul. L. Rev.
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The rule and its rationale were adopted by the Supreme Court
in 1884:
But the presumption upon which weight is given to such evidence,
namely, that one who is innocent will not imperil his safety or
prejudice his interests by an untrue statement, ceases when the
confession appears to have been made either in consequence of
inducements of a temporal nature, held out by one in authority,
touching the charge preferred, or because of a threat or promise
by or in the presence of such person, which, operating upon the
fears or hopes of the accused, in reference to the charge, deprives
him of that freedom of will or self-control essential to make his
confession voluntary within the meaning of the law.'8
From 1884 through 1940, the rule remained substantially un-
changed,' 9 and, although the word "voluntary" was used to describe
admissible confessions, it was clear that the test of admissibility
was whether the confession was obtained under reliability-impairing
circumstances. 20  However, in 1941, in Lisenba v. California,2' a
different tack was taken. Although the Court stated that "the aim
of the rule that a confession is inadmissible unless voluntarily made
is to exclude false evidence," 22 five sentences later the Court ob-
served that "the aim of the requirement of due process is not to
exclude presumptively false evidence but to prevent fundamental
unfairness in the use of evidence whether true or false.123 Of the
two statements, the latter has proved the more durable. Although
the Court has continued to mask its decisions with the test of
125 (1956); McCormick, "Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of
Confessions," 24 Texas L. Rev. 239 (1946).
That the rule was intended to serve the purpose of "reliability" appears from
the holding in The King v. Warickshall, 1 Leach C. C. 263, 168 Eng. Rep. 234
(K.B. 1783), that tangible evidence derived from an inadmissible confession is ad-
missible. See also Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 583 n. 25 (1961). It should
be noted that the phrase "fair risk of falsity" is not used in any sense of mathematical
probability. Rather, the phrase has meaning only as the subject of an intuitive judg-
ment expressed in the context of a system that has traditionally sought to minimize
erroneous determinations of guilt.
18 Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 585 (1884). (Emphasis added.)
19 In Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), the Court held that a con-
fession was obtained under circumstances that violated the privilege against self-
incrimination. However, the impact of the self-incrimination theory was not felt
until Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964).
20 See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936); Ziang Sun Wan v.
United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14 (1924). But see Comment, 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 556,
563 (1964).
21 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
2 Id. at 236.
23 Ibid.
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voluntariness, 24 and although the decisions can be harmonized with
a theory of reliability,25 a police-methods theory has emerged. In
Spano v. New York, it was stated:
The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions
does not turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also
turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the
law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty can
be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those
thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves.26
The point was reiterated in Blackburn v. Alabama, where the Court
added:
Thus a complex of values underlies the stricture against use by
the state of confessions which, by way of convenient shorthand
this court terms involuntary, and the role played by each in any
situation varies according to the particular circumstances of the
case.
27
Haynes v. Waskington s clearly demonstrates the extent of
24 See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963); Culombe v. Connecti-
cut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961);
Kamisar, supra note 9, at 742, 746.
25 Kamisar, supra note 9, at 753-55. Professor Kamisar suggests a two-step
theory of reliability:
(A) Is this particular defendant's confession "unreliable" or "untrust-
worthy"? or (B) what is the likelihood, objectively considered, that the
interrogation methods employed in this case create a substantial risk that a
person subjected to them will falsely confess-whether or not this particular
defeadant did?
Id. at 753. All of the Supreme Court cases in which confessions have been held in-
admissible are consistent with reliability theory (B). Id. at 754.
It is interesting to note that when the commentators speak of an unreliable
confession, they apparently mean a confession that is wholly false. See 3 Wigmore
§§ 824, 867; Kamisar, supra note 9, at 755; McCormick, sepra note 17, at 239; Paul-
sen, supra note 5, at 429. However, I am convinced by a relatively brief criminal
law practice that there is a much greater risk: the interrogee who is guilty of some
wrongdoing may, either through ignorance or in order to end the pressure of inter-
rogation, accede to a more serious version of the offense. The resulting confession
is partially true. However, the one or two-line inaccuracy or falsity may spell the
difference between an -aggravated offense and a mitigated offense. For an example
of the risk of "partial unreliability," see Record, p. 138, Stroble v. California, 343
U.S. 181 (1952), in which the defendant, under the skillful interrogation of an
assistant prosecutor, admitted an intention to kill. The risk of partial unreliability
has moved the Supreme Court of New Jersey to grant to a defendant pre-trial
discovery of his confession. State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 145 A2d 313 (1958).
26 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
27 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960). (Emphasis added.) See Jackson v. Denno, 378
U.S. 368, 376 (1964).
28 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
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the restriction imposed by the police-methods theory. Shortly after
a filling station robbery had been reported, petitioner was seen in
the area by several policemen. After stating that he lived nearby,
he walked to a house, fumbled with the screen door, then returned
to the police car and stated, "You got me, let's go." 9 He admitted
the robbery and, en route to the police station, identified the filling
station. At the police station he was interrogated for about thirty
minutes and he made a second oral confession. The next morning
he made a third oral confession and it was transcribed. Shortly
thereafter, he was taken to the office of a deputy prosecutor where
he made a fourth confession which was also transcribed. Although
Haynes refused to sign the transcribed confession, he did sign the
transcript of the confession given earlier that morning. Prior to
signing the confession, he had been held incommunicado for about
sixteen hours, contrary to state law, and, although he had requested
permission to call his wife on the morning following arrest, he was
told that "when I had made a statement and cooperated with
them that they would see to it that as soon as I got booked I
could call my wife."3' 0 Apparently at no time had Haynes been
advised of a right to remain silent or to consult counsel. On the
other hand, Haynes made no claim of physical abuse, lack of food
or sleep, or prolonged interrogation.
Using the traditional jargon of voluntariness, a five-judge
majority held the confession inadmissible.
Confronted with the express threat of continued incommunicado
detention and induced by the promise of communication with and
access to family Haynes understandably chose to make and sign the
damning written statement; given the unfair and inherently co-
ercive context in which made, that choice cannot be said to be
the voluntary product of a free and unconstrained will, as required
by the Fourteenth Amendment. 31
In no case of an adult defendant prior to Haynes had a confession
"secured by so mild a whip 3 2 been held inadmissible. 3 Unlike
the "composite defendant" of prior cases, Haynes was not mentally
subnormal, young, or naive and impressionable.34 To the contrary,
he was an adult, of at least average intelligence, who, in the eleven
29 Id. at 520 (dissenting opinion).
30 Id. at 509. Haynes also claimed that he had been denied permission to call
his wife on the evening of the arrest. This claim was contradicted by the police and
was therefore not considered by the Court. Ibid.
31 Id. at 514. (Emphasis added.)
32 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
33 See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 522 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
84 Ibid.
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years preceding his trial, had been convicted of drunken driving,
resisting arrest, being without a driver's license, breaking and enter-
ing, robbery, breaking jail, and taking a car. 5 Moreover, he had
volunteered a threshold confession. Measuring the result in Haynes
by its facts, it is a good bet that a majority of the present Court
would hold inadmissible the confessions found to have been ad-
missible in such cases as Lisenba v. California,36  Gallegos v.
Nebraska'37 Stroble v. California,3' and Stein v. New York.3
Haynes clearly stands at the periphery of the confessions rule.
In the hands of the current majority, the confessions rule
operates with a doctrinal sweep that permits little, if any, police
pressure to obtain a confession. Yet, police interrogation depends
in large part upon an application of pressure which is made effec-
tive by isolating the accused from those who give him strength.4 °
Under Haynes, therefore, productive interrogation (interrogation
followed by a constitutionally admissible confession) is, in theory,
substantially jeopardized.41 I stress the words "in theory" because,
in the area of criminal procedure, law in the Supreme Court cases
frequently does not reflect the reality of law in its operational
aspects at the police station and in its doctrinal aspects in state and
lower federal courts. If it is clear that a confession is essential to
conviction, it is unlikely that the police will refrain from hard inter-
rogation. If the police are forced to choose between no-conviction-
because-no-confession and the more remote risk that a conviction
35 Ibid.
36 314 U.S. 219 (1941). Defendant was questioned in relays throughout the
night; he was slapped in the face the next night; he remained in custody for twelve
more days; on the twelfth day, after an eight-hour interrogation during which he
requested but did not receive counsel, he confessed.
37 342 U.S. 55 (1951). Defendant confessed in Texas to a crime committed in
Nebraska; the confession came after repeated interrogation during several days of
incommunicado detention; six days later, in Nebraska, he again confessed.
38 343 U.S. 181 (1952). Shortly after his arrest, defendant was kicked and was
threatened with a blackjack; about an hour later, defendant was interrogated; after
two hours of interrogation, he confessed; during the interrogation, an attorney was
denied permission to see the defendant.
39 346 U.S. 156 (1963). Defendant Cooper confessed after repeated interrogation
during two days of incommunicado detention; defendant Stein was interrogated for
ten hours during sixteen hours of incommunicado detention; he confessed on the
following morning.
40 Incommunicado detention is a recommended device of interrogation. "The
principal psychological factor contributing to a successful interrogation is privacy-
being alone with the person under interrogation." Inbau & Reid, Criminal Interroga-
tion and Confessions 1 (1962).
41 See Inbau, "Police Interrogation-A Practical Necessity," in Police Power and
Individual Freedom 149 (Sowle ed. 1962).
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will not be sustained because of coercive interrogation, the latter
is the likely choice.4
Moreover, the sweep of the confessions rule is mitigated in
practice by the Court's own adherence to the terminology of volun-
tariness which hides the values now underlying the confessions
rule.4" The doctrine emphasizes police conduct as is made abun-
dantly clear by Haynes. The terminology of the rule, with a sub-
stantial assist from Mr. Justice Frankfurter's treatise in Cilombe
v. ConnecticUt,44 emphasizes the interrogee's reaction. The reaction,
measured by the terminology of voluntariness, is, at best, a mixed
question of law and fact.43 To be sure, the fact is of constitutional
dimension, but it is still a fact. The result is that the fact-finding
process 46 cuts against the grain of the theory by dealing with the
wrong issue. Further, because the issue frequently involves con-
tradictory testimony, there arises a question of credibility, a con-
test between the defendant (whose guilt is manifested by his
confession) and the police. Whether the question is resolved by
judge or jury, it will in most cases be resolved against the defend-
ant 47 and he will be convicted. If he does not appeal, the matter
is ended. If he does appeal, he runs up against the reluctance of
appellate courts to overturn findings of fact 48 and the impossibility
of adequate policing by the Supreme Court.49 Although he does
42 Comment, 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 313, 320 (1964).
43 Kamisar, supra note 9, at 753; Meltzer, "Involuntary Confessions: The Alloca-
tion of Responsibility Between Judge and Jury," 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317, 328 (1954);
Paulsen, supra note 5, at 434.
44 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961). Mr. Justice Frankfurter's insistence on the test of
voluntariness is criticized in Kamisar, supra note 9, at 744-47, 752-53, 759.
45 Culombe v. Connecticut, supra note 24, at 603-05; Paulsen, supra note 5, at
433-34.
46 Under the recent decision in Jackson v. Derno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), over-
ruling Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953), a judge or a special jury (but not
the trial jury) must resolve the question of voluntariness.
47 The rationale of Jackson v. Denno, supra note 46, is based on the assumption
that the jury's resolution of the credibility problem will be affected by its knowledge
that the defendant has confessed it. It may be questioned, however, whether a signif-
icantly greater protection is afforded by allocating the responsibility to a judge or to
a special jury.
48 See, for example, People v. Escobedo, 28 Ill. 2d 41, 190 N.E2d 825 (1963),
rev'd on other grounds, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); People v. Everett, 10 N.Y.2d 500,
180 N.E.2d 556 (1962), petition for habeas corpus granted sub nor. United States
ex rel. Everett v. Murphy, 329 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1964) ; State v. Haynes, 58 Wash.2d
716, 364 P2d 935 (1961), rez'd, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Spanogle, supra note 9, at
457-59.
49 Since 1935, the Court has decided thirty-seven coerced confession cases. See
Comment, 31 U. Chli. L. Rev. 313 n. 1 (1964).
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have a federal habeas corpus remedy,50 he is in jail during the
pendency of the proceedings and whether the proceedings prove
fruitful rests in large part upon whether the federal court has in
mind the very standard from which its attention is diverted by
the terminology of voluntariness. Thus, the result probably is an
uneasy compromise in which the operation of the rule lags behind
theory and thereby encourages the police to undertake the sort of
interrogation that the theory prohibits. If the Court continues
vigorously to proscribe "mild whips," as in Haynes, and particu-
larly if the Court abandons the terminology of voluntariness, the
theory of the confessions rule may filter down to other courts, and
the area of compromise may shrink. But, unless the confessions
rule has been made obsolete by recent developments, 5' there will
still be some compromise and there will still be productive police
interrogation.
III. FOURTH-AMENDMENT RESTRICTIONS
ON POLICE INTERROGATION
Until the decision in Wong Sun v. United States,2 it had gen-
erally been assumed that the fourth amendment had little impact
on police interrogation, 8 and a substantial majority of courts had
refused to suppress confessions as derivatives of an unlawful arrest. 4
In Wong Sun, six or seven federal narcotics agents, acting without
probable cause, broke into the house of petitioner Toy and followed
him into a bedroom. When Toy reached into a drawer, an agent
drew a gun, pulled Toy's hand out of the drawer, arrested him,
and then handcuffed him. Interrogated in the bedroom, Toy made
incriminating statements and thereafter led the agents to the house
of Yee where the agents found narcotics. Toy was then brought
before a United States Commissioner for a preliminary hearing
and was released on his own recognizance. Several days later, in
the office of the Narcotics Bureau, Toy was again interrogated
and he made further incriminating statements. At Toy's trial, the
court accepted into evidence the narcotics, the statements made in
the bedroom, and the statements made in the federal office. Toy
was found guilty and his conviction was affirmed by the court of
50 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-54 (1959). See generally, Bator, "Finality in Criminal Law
and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners," 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441 (1963).
51 The possibility of obsolescence is discussed infra at 472-73.
52 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
53 Kamisar, "Illegal Searches or Seizures and Contemporaneous Incriminating
Statements: A Dialogue on a Neglected Area of Criminal Procedure," 1961 U Ill.
L.F. 78, 84-85.
54 Ibid.
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appeals.55 In the Supreme Court, -the conviction was reversed on
the ground that the bedroom statements and the narcotics were the
derivatives of an unconstitutional arrest.56 Regarding the state-
ments, the Court, following Silverman v. United States,57 held that
the protection of the fourth amendment and the purpose of the
exclusionary rule apply to verbal as well as physical evidence.58
In determining whether Wong Sun is a significant restriction
on police interrogation, there arises the preliminary question
whether Wong Sun applies to the states. Although microscopic
analysis of different parts of the opinion yields different conclu-
sions,5 the matter has probably been put to rest by the generally
unnoticed per curiam decision in Traub v. Connecticut.0 In Traub,
the defendant was arrested without probable cause for the offense
of arson and was taken to a police station where, after interrogation,
he confessed. Following conviction, he appealed on the ground that
his confession was inadmissible because it had been obtained after
an unlawful arrest or during an unlawful detention or both. The
Connecticut court, relying on the appellate court decision in Wong
Sun,6' held that "the existence of an illegal arrest and detention
does not automatically render inadmissible confessions made after
the arrest or during the period of detention." 62 Traub then filed
a petition for a writ of certiorari, and the Supreme Court, in a
unanimous decision, vacated the judgment and remanded the case
for reconsideration in the light of Wong Sun and Ker v. California.63
In Ker, the Court had held that fourth-amendment questions in
state courts were to be governed by federal standards. Conse-
quently, Traub must be taken as establishing that the Wong Sun
rule is applicable to the states.
However, the decision of the Connecticut court on remand
indicates that pressing problems remain. The court held that Wong
Sun created no absolute, fourth-amendment barrier to admissibility;
that a confession is inadmissible under Wong Sun only if there is
55 Wong Sun v. United States, 288 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1961).
56 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The Court held that the
statements made in the federal office were inadmissible for want of sufficient corrobora-
tion. Id. at 491.
57 365 U.S. 505 (1961). The Court held inadmissible verbal evidence obtained
by the trespassory attachment of an electronic listening device to petitioners' house.
58 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1963).
59 See Broeder, "Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith and Hope,"
42 Neb. L. Rev. 483, 557-64 (1963).
60 374 U.S. 493 (1963).
61 288 F2d 366 (9th Cir. 1963).
62 State v. Traub, 150 Conn. 169, 173-74, 187 A2d 230, 232 (1962), vacated and
remanded, 374 U.S. 493 (1963).
63 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
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a causal relationship between the illegal detention and the con-
fession; and that this rule of inadmissibility is the only change made
by Wong Sun in the coerced confessions rule.64 A slightly different
rationale in favor of admissibility was used in Hollingswortk v.
United States.6" The court held that -the gauge of admissibility is
still the voluntariness of the confession, and that, in Wong Sun, the
Court held only that the unlawful arrest made the confession
involuntary 6
On the other hand, in several state and federal cases, confes-
sions not claimed to have been involuntary have been held inad-
missible under Wong Sun apparently solely because they were
obtained shortly after an unconstitutional arrest or search. 7 Typi-
cal of the uneven treatment accorded Wong Sun is Commonwealtk
v. Palladino.6 8 There, immediately after an arrest assumed by the
court to have been unconstitutional, the defendant made certain
statements. About an hour after his arrest, he made additional
statements at a police station. The court held that what the
defendant said immediately after arrest was inadmissible, but that
what he said an hour later was admissible.
The picture, then, is one of judicial disagreement over the
meaning of the Wong Sun rule (a disagreement that parallels the
theory-practice gap under the confessions rule), and the blame must
be borne entirely by the unsurpassedly vague opinion of Mr. Justice
Brennan in Wong Sun. The ambiguities have been explored in
detail elsewhere 6 9 and need not be considered here. It is sufficient
for present purposes to note that isolated passages of the opinion
support all of the subsequent, divergent decisions. Until the rule
is clarified by the Supreme Court, it will probably have little impact
on police interrogation, and, at this juncture, appraisal can be made
only in the alternative. If the Wong Sun result is based on a test
64 State v. Traub, 151 Conn. 246, 196 A2d 755 (1963).
65 321 F2d 342 (10th Cir. 1963).
66 The same result was reached in United States v. Burke, 215 F. Supp. 503
(D. Mass. 1963), aff'd, 328 F.2d 399 (1st Cir. 1964); Peal v. State, 232 Md. 329,
193 A2d 53 (1963) ; Stewart v. State, 232 Md. 318, 193 A.2d 40 (1963) ; Prescoe v.
State, 231 Md. 486, 191 A.2d 226 (1963) ; State v. Lavalle, 104 N.H. 443, 189 A.2d
475 (1963). See also United States v. McGavic, 337 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1964) ; United
States v. Smalls, 223 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
67 United States v. Marrese, 336 F2d 501 (3d Cir. 1964); Gatlin v. United
States, 326 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1963); United States v. Sims, 231 F. Supp. 251 (D.
Md. 1964) ; People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal.2d 448, 380 P.2d 658 (1963) ; Commonwealth
v. Jacobs, 191 N.E.2d 873 (Mass. 1963) ; State v. Mercurio, 194 A2d 574 (R.L 1963).
See Rogers v. United States, 330 F2d 535, 540-41 (5th Cir. 1964).
68 195 N.E2d 769 (Mass. 1964).
69 Broeder, "Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith and Hope," 42 Neb.
L. Rev. 483 (1963).
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of voluntariness, it adds nothing to the confessions rule. Similarly,
it will prove to be illusory if it is based on a causal relationship
between the unconstitutional arrest and the confession. Because
it is highly unlikely that many arrestees will know that the arrest
is improper, it will be impossible to establish a causal relationship
between the illegality of the arrest and the confession.
If, however, the Wong Sun rule rests exclusively on the uncon-
stitutionality of the arrest, as some commentators have suggested,70
the rule may have drastic consequences for police interrogation.
Available evidence indicates that the police frequently arrest on
less than probable cause.71 Consequently, unless the constitutional
standard of probable cause is watered down in subsequent cases,72
a stringent interpretation of the Wong Sun rule against the state
will make inadmissible a confession obtained after a dragnet arrest
or after the so-called "arrest on suspicion" or "arrest for investiga-
tion." 7 The result will be a second giant step toward the end of
70 Shadoan, Law and Tactics in Federal Criminal Cases 102 (1964); Broeder,
supra note 69, at 531; 51 Geo. L.J. 838 (1963). But see Kamisar, "What is an
'Involuntary' Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and Reid's 'Criminal Interroga-
tion and Confessions'," 17 Rutgers L. Rev. 728, 754 n. 172 (1963). It is quite likely
that this position is correct. Of the various reasons urged in support of the exclusion-
ary rule, perhaps the most persuasive is this: those persons who drafted the federal
and state constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable search and seizure expected
compliance from law enforcement officers and contemplated that, in some cases, com-
pliance would interfere with the gathering of evidence. Under the exclusionary rule,
the case is treated as though compliance had taken place. See Paulsen, "The Exclu-
sionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police," in Police Power and Individual Freedom
87, 88 (Sowle ed. 1962). Given this view of the exclusionary rule, it makes no sense
to distinguish verbal from tangible evidence. Consequently, absent any question of
standing, a strong argument can be made that the Wong Sun rule does rest exclusively
on the unconstitutionality of the arrest
71 See Trebach, The Rationing of Justice 4-7 (1964); Foote, "Safeguards in
the Law of Arrest," 52 Nw. U.L. Rev. 16, 20-27 (1957) ; Kamisar & Choper, "The
Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations,"
48 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 48 (1963) ; La Fave, "Detention for Investigation by the Police:
An Analysis of Current Practices," 1962 Wash. U.L.Q. 331, 336-37, 362-64. Indirect
evidence that the police arrest on less than probable cause may be found in the
fact that the standard work on police interrogation, Inbau & Reid, Criminal Inter-
rogation and Confessions (1962), contains a section entitled "Tactics and Techniques
for the Interrogation of Suspects Whose Guilt is Doubtful or Uncertain." Id. at 88.
72 For an argument that the exclusionary rule may result in a weakening of the
probable cause standard, see Barrett, "Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the
Fourth Amendment," 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. 46, 65-66. See also Traynor, "Mapp v. Ohio
at Large in the Fifty States," 1962 Duke L.J. 319, 331-32.
73 For an example of the dragnet arrest, see Note, "Philadelphia Police Practice
and the Law of Arrest," 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1182, 1206 (1952); for an example of
the investigative arrest, see Gatlin v. United States, 326 F2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
On the constitutionality of detention without probable cause for the purpose of inter-
rogation, see Foote, "The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of
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"productive" police interrogation. This step, it should be noted,
has nothing to do with the accuracy or reliability of the guilt-
finding process. But it has everything to do with the constitutional
value of privacy-the right to be free from governmental restraint
unless the state has probable cause to take action-a value which
is hard to accommodate with present procedures of police inter-
rogation.74
IV. THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
In 1908, in Twining v. New Jersey, 5 eight judges of the Su-
preme Court held that the fifth amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination did not apply to the states. Thirty-nine years
later, in Adamson v. California,76 five judges of the Supreme Court
adhered to Twining. Both cases involved comment on the defend-
ant's failure to testify at trial, and, in spite of sweeping language
in both opinions, there was some reason to believe that the Court
would not tolerate more severe sanctions.77 However, in Cohen v.
Hurley, s five judges held that New York could constitutionally
disbar an attorney who, on grounds of self-incrimination, refused
to testify at a judicial inquiry into ambulance chasing. In a dis-
senting opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan argued that the privilege
should be applied to the states with full force; that there was no
historical or logical basis for partial application; and that, in fact,
there had already been a partial application. In support of the
last point, he observed:
The case before us presents, for me, another situation in which
the application of the full sweep of a specific is denied, although
the court has held that its restraints are absorbed in the Four-
Arrest?" in Police Power and Individual Freedom 29 (Sowle ed. 1962). An incisive
analysis of arrests for investigation in the District of Columbia is contained in Report
and Recommendations of the Commissioners' Committee on Police Arrests for In-
vestigation (1962) (the Horsky Report). For a review of the report, see Kamisar,
Book Review, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1502 (1963).
74 For a hint that the requirement of probable cause may also be applicable to
legislative inquiries, see Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S.
539, 554-55 (1962). The point is suggested in Professor Harry Kalven's forthcoming
book, The Negro and the First Amendment, the manuscript of which was presented
at the Ohio State University Law Forum Lectures, April 7-9, 1964.
75 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
76 332 U.S. 46 (1947). On the problem of selective incorporation, see Kadish,
"Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication: A Survey and Criticism,"
66 Yale L.J. 319 (1957); Comment, 58 Yale L.J. 268 (1949).
77 See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 15-16 n. 1 (1964) (dissenting opinion);
Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 134 n. 10 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
78 366 U.S. 117 (1961).
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teenth Amendment for some purposes. Only this Term we ap-
plied, admittedly not in terms but nevertheless in fact the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment to invalidate a state conviction obtained with the aid
of a confession, however true, which was secured from the accused
by duress or coercion. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534; and
see Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532. 79
In the critical comment that followed Colhen, 0 no notice was taken
of Mr. Justice Brennan's obvious effort to effect an engagement
between the privilege against self-incrimination and the coerced
confessions rule. Indeed, most lawyers, judges, and commentators,
if pressed on the matter, probably would have said,-that the point
was a cute forensic device but otherwise not meritorious.81 For all
practical purposes, the point was ignored until, infused by the vote
of Mr. Justice Goldberg, it became a cornerstone of Mr. Justice
Brennan's opinion in Malloy v. Hogan.8 2
In 1959, William Malloy was convicted of the misdemeanor of
gambling in Hartford, Connecticut. About sixteen months later,
he was ordered to testify at a judicial inquiry into gambling. Asked
a series of questions concerning his arrest and conviction, he
invoked the privilege against self-incrimination, was committed
for contempt, and sought his release through a petition for habeas
corpus in which he specifically raised the federal constitutional
issue.8 3 The superior court denied relief and Malloy appealed to
the Supreme Court of Errors. Although the latter court stated
that the federal constitutional privilege was inapplicable to state
proceedings, it recognized that some restrictions were imposed by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. However,
relying on both state and federal cases, the court held that Malloy
had not sufficiently demonstrated a risk of incrimination."" Relief
was denied, but Malloy's petition for certiorari was granted by the
Supreme Court.
79 Id. at 159.
80 26 Albany L. Rev. 89 (1962); 47 A.B.A.J. 821 (1961); 47 Cornell L.Q. 255
(1962); 47 Iowa L. Rev. 507 (1962).
81 See 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2266 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited
as 8 Wigmore]; Karnisar, "Illegal Searches or Seizures and Contemporaneous In-
criminating Statements: A Dialogue on a Neglected Area of Criminal Procedure,"
1961 U. Ill. L.F. 78, 84 n. 24; Meltzer, "Required Records, The McCarran Act, and
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination," 18 U. Chli. L. Rev. 687, 697-98 (1951).
But see Kamisar & Choper, "The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field
Findings and Legal-Policy Observations," 48 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 50-51 (1963) ; Morgan,
"The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination," 34 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 27-30 (1949).
82 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
83 Malloy v. Hogan, 150 Conn. 220, 223, 187 A2d 744, 746 (1963).
84 Id. at 230-31, 187 A.2d at 749-50.
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Three issues were presented to the Court: whether the fifth-
amendment privilege applied to the states; if so, whether it applied
with full, federal constitutional content; and whether the privilege
had been violated. The Court answered all three questions in the
affirmative. Only the first and second answers will be considered
herein.
In support of his contention that the fifth amendment's privi-
lege against self-incrimination applied to the states, counsel for the
petitioner made a deceptively simple, three-step argument: (1) the
fourth and fifth amendments are "so intertwined as to be comple-
mentary," 85 (2) the fourth amendment applies to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment; (3)
therefore, the fifth amendment should be applied to the states.80
Counsel for Connecticut, however, conceded an even more per-
suasive argument: that underlying the confessions rule was the
privilege against self-incrimination, and that the Court, in the
guise of the confessions rule, had been applying the privilege as a
bar to state inquiry. In a statement that magnificently pointed
up one prosecutor's view of the relationship between the various
possible constitutional restrictions on police interrogation, counsel
for Connecticut observed:
Underlying the decisions excluding coerced confessions is the
implicit assumption that an accused is privileged against incrim-
inating himself, either in the jail house, the grand jury room, or
on the witness stand in a public trial. The principal motivation
for incommunicado coercion by the police is the effort to circum-
vent the suspect's right of silence which will be available to him in
the formal proceedings. cf. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,
571. The principal reason for excluding confessions coerced by
the police is to preserve the right of silence available in later
proceedings.
Even if an accused could be compelled to testify against
himself in a trial, there would still be some motive for attempting
to pry a confession from him before he had counsel. The coerced
confession cases, therefore, also tend to preserve the right to
counsel. Yet no federal right to have counsel present at all official
interrogations has been recognized by the Court. See In re Gro-
ban, 352 U.S. 330; Anonymous v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287. So it is
not merely protection of the right to counsel that is involved, but
preservation of the right of silence. It is fundamentally inconsist-
ent to suggest, as the Court's opinions now suggest, that the State
is entirely free to compel an accused to incriminate himself before
a grand jury, or at the trial, but cannot do so in the police station.
Frank recognition of the fact that the Due Process Clause pro-
hibits the States from enforcing their laws by compelling the
85 Brief for Petitioner, p. 7, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
86 Ibid.
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accused to confess, regardless of where such compulsion occurs,
would not only clarify the principles involved in confession cases,
but would assist the States significantly in their efforts to comply
with the limitations placed upon them by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment .
7
And the Court took him at his word. Although the Court might
have distinguished Twining and Adamson, or might have disagreed
with their rationales outright, it chose to do neither. Rather, the
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Brennan, stated that "De-
cisions of the Court since Twining and Adamson have departed
from the . . .view expressed in those cases. We discuss first the
decisions which forbid the use of coerced confessions in state crim-
inal prosecutions." 88 Following an analysis of cases through Haynes
v. Washington, the Court asserted:
[T]he American system of criminal prosecution is accusatorial,
not inquisitorial, and ... the Fifth Amendment privilege is its
essential mainstay.... Since the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
the States from inducing a person to confess through "sympathy
falsely aroused" [citing Spano v. New York] or other like induce-
ment far short of "compulsion by torture" [citing Haynes], it
follows a fortiori that it also forbids the states to resort to im-
prisonment, as here to compel him to answer questions that might
incriminate him. The Fourteenth Amendment secures against
state invasions the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guar-
antees against federal infringement-the right of a person to
remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise
of his own will.s8
In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice White, joined by Mr.
Justice Stewart, took no issue with what might have seemed to
some a shotgun wedding of the privilege to the confessions rule. 0
His point was that the record did not disclose a risk of incrimina-
tion.91 Only Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice Clark, was
moved to complain that "[I]n none of the cases cited in which was
developed the full sweep of the constitutional prohibition against
the use of coerced confessions at state trials was there anything
to suggest that the Fifth Amendment was being made applicable
87 Brief for Respondent, pp. 11-12, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
88 378 U.S. at 6.
89 378 U.S. at 7-8. (Emphasis added.) The Court also accepted the petitioner's
argument of the relationship between the fourth and fifth amendments. Id. at 8.
0 Id. at 33 (dissenting opinion). The most vigorous argument against blending
the privilege and the confessions rule has been made by Dean Wigmore. See 3 Wig-
more § 823, at 250 n. 5.
91 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 35 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
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to state proceedings." 92 However, even he was forced to note that
"[the coerced confession cases] do, it seems to me, carry an impli-
cation that coercion to incriminate oneself, even when under the
form of law.., is inconsistent with due process." 93
The significance of Malloy lies not in the belief that the privi-
lege is something new to state criminal procedure. To the contrary,
all states have recognized the privilege as a matter of local law.94
What is significant is that, by necessary inference from Mr. Justice
Brennan's opinion, the privilege, as a matter of constitutional law,
applies at the police station.9 5 If the privilege gives the defendant
greater protection than is accorded by the confessions rule, the
latter has become obsolete in determining the admissibility of con-
fessions. The critical questions then, are two: (1) What is the
test for determining whether the police have obtained a confession
92 Id. at 18.
93 Id. at 15-16 n. 1.
94 8 Wigmore § 2252, at 319.
95 Even if Mr. Justice Brennan had not specifically linked the privilege to the
confessions rule, alert defense lawyers surely would have argued that the admissibility
of a confession is governed by fifth-amendment standards.
It is an open question whether the history of the privilege supports application
at the police station. "History is invoked both by those who view the privilege as
applicable only to judicial proceedings and by those who view it as operative during
police interrogation." Comment, 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 556, 559 (1964). For a collection
of authorities, see id. at 561 nn. 24-28. In addition, see Maguire, Evidence, Common
Sense and Common Law 104-7, 121 (1947); Franklin, "The Encyclop6diste Origin
and Meaning of the Fifth Amendment," 15 Law. Guild Rev. 41 (1955); Kauper,
"Judicial Examination of the Accused-A Remedy for the Third Degree," 30 Mich.
L. Rev. 1224, 1232-36 (1932) ; McCormick, "The Scope of Privilege in the Law of
Evidence," 16 Texas L. Rev. 447, 453 (1938).
Prior to Malloy and Escobedo, there was no well settled rule, even in federal
case law, that the privilege applied to police interrogation. Compare Brock v. United
States, 223 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1955) (privilege applicable) with Wood v. United
States, 128 F2d 265, 268 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (privilege inapplicable) (dictum). How-
ever, the Supreme Court had never specifically rejected the privilege. In Wilson v.
United States, 162 U.S. 613 (1896), the Court held admissible incriminating state-
ments made to a United States Commissioner even though the defendant claimed
that he had not been advised of his privilege. However, in Brain v. United States,
168 U.S. 532 (1897), six judges of the same Court held that a confession had been
obtained by a detective in violation of the privilege. Nevertheless, in Powers v.
United States, 223 U.S. 303 (1912), the Court reaffirmed the Wilson rule. For state-
ments supporting an argument that the privilege is the appropriate test, see Culombe
v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 583 n. 25 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.) ; id. at 639 (Douglas,
J, concurring) ; Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558 n. 3 (1954) (Black, J.) ; Stein
v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 197-98 (1953) (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 208
(Douglas, J., dissenting). But see Stein v. New York, spra at 191 (Jackson, J.).
For an argument that the history of the right to counsel supports application at the
police station, see Comment, 73 Yale L.J. 1000 (1964).
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in violation of the privilege; and (2) does the privilege give more
or less protection than the confessions rule? 96
In attempting to ascertain the test to be used in deciding
whether the privilege has been violated by police interrogation,
a stumbling block is immediately encountered: most of the federal
self-incrimination cases do not involve police interrogation. The
paucity of case law may be attributed to two factors. First, until
Malloy, there was no well settled rule, even in federal courts, that
the privilege applied at the police station. 7 Second, the creation
of the McNabb-Mallory rule made it unnecessary in most cases to
consider the confession problem in any terms other than delay.
Indeed, since the decision in McNabb, the Court has reviewed only
one federal case involving the confessions rule. Accordingly, if
a case-law test is sought, reliance must be placed both on the
many cases that do not involve police interrogation and on the
few cases that do.
An examination of the cases that do not involve police inter-
rogation discloses three basic fact situations that deserve comment.
In the first, the court must decide whether the information sought
by the government is within the protection of the privilege, that
is, whether the information is testimonial as opposed to demonstra-
tive,99 or whether the information tends to incriminate. 00 These
cases are irrelevant to the problem under consideration because by
hypothesis the instant problem involves an oral or written confes-
sion, a clearly incriminating, testimonial utterance.
In the second group of cases, the state imposes a sanction
upon the defendant for exercising his privilege.1°1 Here, the only
question is whether the sanction is an impermissible compulsion.0 2
The cases involve such questions as whether a doctor may be pro-
hibited from performing medical duties because he refused to
divulge information when applying for a military commission, 03
and whether a discharge in bankruptcy may be conditioned upon
90 In the following discussion consideration will not be given to the problem of
adoptive admissions after arrest. This problem is admirably treated in Comment,
31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 556 (1964). See Note, 5 Stan. L. Rev. 459 (1953). Nor will con-
sideration be given to the question whether the confessions rule applies to admissions.
See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 162 n. 5 (1953).
O7 Cases cited note 95 supra.
98 United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36 (1951).
99 Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
100 E.g., Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
101 8 Wigmore § 2272, at 440-45.
102 Id. at 440-41.
103 Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
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an incriminating explanation of lost assets.104 Although the cases
are obviously distinguishable from cases involving police inter-
rogation, they raise a question that may also be relevant in the
context of police interrogation: whether the police conduct leading
to the confession constitutes an impermissible compulsion.
In the third group of cases, the defendant answers some ques-
tions, but invokes the privilege as to others.'0 5 Here, the only
question is whether the defendant has waived the privilege.106 The
same question may be relevant to a determination of whether the
privilege has been violated by police interrogation.
Separation of the questions in terms of compulsion and waiver
should not be taken as an indication that the terms are unrelated.
Even though inquiry has not yet been made into the content of
the terms, it is clear that they overlap. If, yielding to impermissi-
ble pressure, the defendant confesses, both terms may be applied.
The defendant has been compelled to incriminate himself and he
has not waived his privilege. On the other hand, pressure may be
lacking to such an extent that an argument of compulsion would
be frivolous. At the same time, it could be argued that the defend-
ant had not waived his privilege. Perhaps he did not know that
he had a privilege; perhaps he was tricked into making a statement;
or perhaps he did not realize the incriminating import of his state-
ments. Whatever the situation, if the argument of non-waiver is
permissible, and if, as permitted, it is broad enough to cover the
case, the traditional law of confessions has been shattered. An
examination of the few self-incrimination/confessions cases indicates
that the devastation may already have occurred.
Three cases must be noted, Brain v. United States,10 7 Brock
v. United States,08 and Escobedo v. Illinois.0 9 In Brain, the de-
fendant, an American seaman, was suspected of murdering his
captain, and was interrogated by a detective in Halifax, Nova
Scotia. Prior to the interrogation, the defendant's clothing was
removed for inspection. While the defendant was nude, the de-
tective told him that a fellow-sailor claimed to have observed him
104 Kaufman v. Hurwitz, 176 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1949).
105 E.g., Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
106 Ibid. Also pertinent are the few state cases in which, at trial, an unrepre-
sented defendant voluntarily testifies without first being informed of his privilege of
silence. It has generally been held that the defendant's testifying does not constitute
a waiver of the privilege. People v. Kramer, 38 Cal. Rptr. 487 (App. 1964) ; Annot.,
79 A.L.R. 2d 643 (1961). The cases stand for the proposition that the relevant
criterion is not compulsion but waiver.
107 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
108 223 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1955).
109 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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commit the murder in the captain's cabin. When Brain was
informed that the fellow-sailor had been standing at the wheel, he
replied, "He could not see me from there." "lo This denial was
accepted into evidence for its implication of guilt, and Brain was
convicted. The Supreme Court, however, held the statement
inadmissible under the self-incrimination clause of the fifth
amendment."'
Much of the opinion is couched in the language of the con-
fessions rule,112 and, in view of the fact that Brain had been stripped
prior to the interrogation, the case may represent nothing more
than a recognition that an interrogee who is stripped may rea-
sonably fear a beating.1 3 However, the Court also stressed the
fact that the statement resulted from an accusation:
But the situation of the accused, and the nature of the communi-
cation made to him by the detective, necessarily overthrows any
possible implication that his reply to the detective could have been
the result of a purely voluntary mental action; that is to say, when
all the surrounding circumstances are considered in their true
relations, not only is the claim that the statement was voluntary
overthrown, but the impression is irresistibly produced that it
must necessarily have been the result of either hope or fear, or
both, operating on the mind.
It cannot be doubted that, placed in the position which the
accused was when the statement was made to him that the other
suspected person had charged him with crime, the result was to
produce upon his mind the fear that if he remained silent it would
be considered an admission of guilt, and therefore render certain
his being committed for trial as the guilty person, and it cannot
be conceived that the converse impression would not have natu-
rally arisen, that by denying there was hope of removing the
suspicion from himself." 4
Although the quoted passage is not irreconcilable with the con-
fessions rule, it can be interpreted as a rejection of all confessions
that result from interrogation, all confessions, that is, except those
that are volunteered. Such an interpretation would flow from a
deep-seated distrust of the techniques of interrogation. That the
Court entertained such a distrust is clear from its reference to the
statement in Brown v. Walker" 5r regarding the origin of the
privilege:
110 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 539 (1897).
'lM Id. at 542.
112 Id. at 542-43, 545-49.
113 This was the rationale of Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
"14 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 562 (1897).
115 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
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if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent con-
nection with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the
questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial character, the
temptation to press the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be
timid or reluctant, to push him into a corner, to entrap him into
fatal contradictions... made the system so odious as to give rise
to a demand for its total abolition.116
However, to question the techniques of interrogation and to say
that the privilege bars the admissibility of a confession that is not
volunteered is not to establish with any precision a test for deter-
mining when the privilege has been violated. Nor is a test estab-
lished by regarding a confession as volunteered only if the defend-
ant desires to confess. As noted above, a determination of whether
the privilege has been violated may be made by either of two over-
lapping tests: whether the defendant was compelled to incriminate
himself, and whether the defendant waived his privilege. In Brain,
primary emphasis appears to have been placed on the compulsion
test. However, there is nothing in Bram that constitutes a rejec-
tion of the waiver test. Moreover, because it is required that a
waiver be voluntary,1 7 the same result would have been reached
under either test. In short, insofar as the articulation of a test is
concerned, Brain is probably a standoff.
In Brock v. United States,"' federal revenue agents discovered
an illicit still near a house. Looking through a window, they ob-
served the defendant sleeping. One of the agents, pretending to
be a fellow-moonshiner, said, "Come down to the still and help
us." 110 The defendant, still asleep, said, "No, I am not going
down there today." 120 The agent then stated that a blower had
broken and that help was needed. The defendant replied in his
sleep, "You ... wouldn't help me last night, and I am not going
to help you today." 121 This statement was accepted into evidence
at his trial, and the defendant was convicted. On appeal, the
statement was held inadmissible by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit:
Evidence obtained at the end of a whip is no less voluntary than
that derived by insidious and more subtle means where the oppor-
116 Id. at 596. (Emphasis added.) The passage is quoted in Brain, 168 U.S.
at 544.
117 See 8 Wigmore § 2276, at 456.
118 223 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1955), noted in 34 Texas L. Rev. 472 (1956), 1956
Wash. U.L.Q. 127.
119 Id. at 684.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid. (Omission in original.)
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tunity to exercise the right against self-incrimination is absent.
Before a man can be compelled to testify against himself, he must
have a fair chance to exercise his right under the Fifth Amend-
ment.122
The court thus blended the language of compulsion with the lan-
guage of waiver. The principal ingredient, however, is waiver. If
the agents had simply overheard incriminating statements made in
sleep, it could not fairly be argued that they had compelled the
remarks. Even though they induced the statements in Brock, they
used no pressure. What must be emphasized, then, is that the
defendant was unaware that he was making a statement, that it
was incriminating and that it was being recorded in the agent's
memory. In sum, the defendant had no opportunity to assert or
waive his privilege. However, it should be noted that the incrim-
inating statements in Brock probably would have been inadmissible
as involuntary even under the confessions rule.12 3 Consequently,
although Brock suggests the waiver test, it, too, is probably no
more than a standoff.
In Escobedo v. Illinois,24 the defendant was arrested on sus-
picion of murder and was interrogated during a fifteen hour period.
He made no incriminating statements and was released on a writ
of habeas corpus obtained by his attorney. Eleven days later, he
was re-arrested and was taken to the police station. He requested
an opportunity to see his attorney but the request was denied.
Shortly after the defendant's arrival at the police station, his
attorney arrived and demanded to see him. The demand was
refused. At one point, the attorney saw the defendant through
an open door and made a gesture which the defendant interpreted
as an admonition of silence. This was the only contact between
attorney and client at the police station.
During the interrogation, the defendant was accused by a co-
defendant of firing the gun. He replied, "I didn't shoot Manuel,
you did it," 125 thereby admitting some knowledge of the crime. The
admission was apparently used as a wedge and the defendant made
further incriminating statements. At no time did anyone at the
police station advise the defendant of his rights. Although the
defendant had consulted counsel during the period between arrests,
the record disclosed only that counsel had told the defendant "to
tell the officers in a nice way that [he] was sorry but that [he]
122 Id. at 685.
123 See Herman, "The Use of Hypno-Induced Statements in Criminal Cases,"
25 Ohio St. LJ. 1, 44-48 (1964).
124 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
125 Id. at 483.
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could not talk to them until [he] had the advice of [his] lawyer." 126
The record did not disclose that the attorney had specifically
advised the defendant of his privilege against self-incrimination.
After the defendant's conviction had been affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Illinois, 27 the Supreme Court of the United
States granted certiorari. In his brief, the defendant argued
that the confession was inadmissible under the confessions rule ' 28
and that it was inadmissible under a right-to-counsel theory.129
In support of his confessions-rule argument, the defendant stressed,
as part of the "totality of the circumstances," that he had not been
advised of the privilege,130 and that, as in Bram, incrimination re-
sulted from the defendant's attempt to deny an accusation of
guilt.' In support of his right-to-counsel argument, the defendant
claimed that the presence of counsel was necessary to effectuate
the privilege. 132 Thus, although the Court did not have before it
the form of the privilege argument, 133 it did have the substance.
As will be discussed in detail later,' 34 the Court, in an opinion
by Mr. Justice Goldberg, held the confession inadmissible on a
right-to-counsel theory. However, the privilege argument did not
go unnoticed:
the purpose of the interrogation was to 'get him' to confess
his guilt despite his constitutional right not to do so. At the time
of his arrest and throughout the course of the interrogation, the
police told petitioner that they had convincing evidence that he
had fired the fatal shots. Without informing him of his absolute
right to remain silent in the face of this accusation, the police
urged him to make a statement. 3 5
If, after Malloy v. Hogan, there was any basis to question the
applicability of the privilege at the police station, Escobedo
answers the question. The privilege is applicable. Moreover, by
inference from Escobedo, the privilege supplants the confessions
rule as a test for determining the admissibility of confessions
obtained by the police.' On the facts of Escobedo, the confession
126 Brief for Petitioner, p. 19, Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
127 People v. Escobedo, 28 Ill. 2d 41, 190 N.E.2d 825 (1963).
128 Brief for Petitioner, pp. 10-32, Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964)
129 Id. at 33-42.
130 Id. at 18-20.
131 Id. at 22-23.
132 Id. at 37.
18 Escobedo was argued on April 29, 1964. 32 U.S.L. Week 3384 (May 5, 1964).
Malloy was decided on June 15, 1964.
:34 Ifra at 485-90.
135 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485 (1964).
136 In his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Wite observed that the majority had
abandoned "the voluntary-involuntary test for admissibility of confessions:' Id. at 496.
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could have been held inadmissible under the confessions rule. ST
Indeed, Escobedo probably was a stronger case for inadmissibility
than Haynes v. Washrington."' Like Haynes, Escobedo had been
held incommunicado. Unlike Haynes, Escobedo was twenty-two
years old and of Mexican extraction. Apparently he had no prior
criminal record, he had not made a threshold confession, he was
interrogated while handcuffed in a standing position, he was nervous
and upset during the interrogation, he had not slept well for a
week prior to the interrogation, he was cut off from the only
person who had previously given him advice,'139 and part of the
interrogation was conducted by a Spanish-speaking policeman who
grew up in the defendant's neighborhood and who knew the de-
fendant's family.'4" The major part of the defendant's brief was
devoted to the confessions rule,' the traditional test for the admis-
sibility of confessions. The Court, however, ignored the test and
used instead a right-to-counsel/privilege approach. Although the
opinion purports to rest on sixth-amendment grounds, 42 the privi-
lege is not just another item under the heading of right to counsel.
To the contrary, the privilege is one of the bases of the right-to-
counsel argument. The defendant so urged in his brief, 43 and Mr.
Justice Goldberg so stated in his opinion. 44 Responding to the
contention that it would be more difficult to obtain confessions if
the interrogee were given an opportunity to consult counsel, Mr.
Justice Goldberg stated that "our Constitution, unlike some others,
strikes the balance in favor of the right of the accused to be advised
by his lawyer of his privilege against self-incrimination." 145
However, to say that, as a result of Escobedo, the privilege has
supplanted the confessions rule is not to say that the privilege
accords greater protection. Consideration still must be given to the
test for determining whether a confession has been obtained in
violation of the privilege. To this problem two parts of the Esco-
bedo opinion are relevant. After launching a vigorous attack on
137 The confessions rule is discussed supra at 452-58. The dissenting judges, all
of whom dissented in Haynes, would have held the confession admissible under the
confessions rule. Id. at 494, 496.
i38 373 U.S. 503 (1963), discussed supra at 454-56.
139 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 482 (1964).
140 Ibid. This aspect of Escobedo suggests the similar circumstances in Spano
v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
141 Brief for Petitioner, pp. 10-32, Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
142 378 U.S. 478, 491 (1964).
143 Supra notes 130, 132.
144 378 U.S. 478, 486, 488 (1964).
14r Id. at 488.
19641
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
the reliability of methods of criminal-law enforcement that depend
on confessions, Mr. Justice Goldberg stated:
We have also learned the companion lesson of history that no
system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to
depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication
through unawareness of their constitutional rights. . . . If the
exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a
system of law enforcement, then there is something very wrong
with that system. 14 6
In a footnote, Mr. Justice Goldberg continued:
The accused may, of course, intelligently and knowingly waive his
privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel either
at a pre-trial stage or at the trial.... But no knowing and intelli-
gent waiver of any constitutional right can be said to have oc-
curred under the circumstances of this case.147
From these quotations, there is reason to suggest that, in future
cases, the admissibility of a confession obtained by the state will
depend upon whether the defendant waived his privilege against
self-incrimination. But under what circumstances can it be said
that the privilege has or has not been waived? What is the mean-
ing or content of waiver? As it bears on these questions, Mr. Jus-
tice Goldberg's opinion is susceptible to a number of interpretations.
As already noted 14s the opinion sets out in detail the factors
that would have been relevant to a confessions-rule determination.
These factors are also relevant to the problem of waiver. If the
defendant was subjected to pressures impermissible under the con-
fessions rule, it can hardly be argued that he voluntarily waived
his privilege against self-incrimination. On the other hand, if waiver
exists in every case in which such pressure is absent, the privilege
accords no greater protection than the confessions rule, and the
impact of Escobedo on the law of confessions will be negligible. It
is possible to argue that minimal pressure, insufficient for invalida-
tion under the confessions rule, would be sufficient for a finding
that the defendant had not voluntarily waived the privilege. The
argument, however, borders on the frivolous not only because it
involves an impossible, metaphysical comparison but also because
the confessions rule, as applied in Haynes, 49 allows almost no lati-
tude for pressure. 50 Consequently, it must be concluded that the
146 Id. at 490. (Emphasis added.)
147 Id. at 490 a. 14. (Emphasis added.)
148 Text accompanying notes 139-40 supra.
149 Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
150 See text to notes 32-39 supra.
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theory of waiver, if tested by voluntariness, represents no addition
to the protection of the confessions rule.
Voluntariness, however, is not the only requirement for a
finding of waiver. If a waiver is to be effective, it must also be
"intelligent" and "knowing." ' In Escobedo it was said that such
a waiver did not occur "under the circumstances of [the] case." 152
Why? Different answers of the drastically different impact, may be
derived by implication from Mr. Justice Goldberg's opinion.15 3
The first answer is an easy one: Escobedo did not know that
he had a constitutional privilege and therefore he could not know-
ingly waive it. No one at the police station warned him of his
rights. Although he had consulted counsel before his second arrest,
and although counsel had told him to remain silent, the record did
not reflect that counsel had specifically advised him of his constitu-
tional privilege. Nor could counsel's gesture at the police station
be taken as such advice. If, in future cases, Escobedo is limited to
this answer, then it adds only the following small morsel to the
confessions rule: the defendant must be advised of his constitutional
privilege before he is interrogated.0 4 Such a warning is now re-
quired by a Texas statute ' and by the Uniform Code of Military
Justice,55 and there is some evidence that neither in Texas nor
in the military jurisdiction has the requirement impaired produc-
tive interrogation. 7 A constitutionally required warning probably
would have no greater effect.15 8
151 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 n. 14 (1964).
152 Ibid.
153 In his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice White indirectly denied the appli-
cability of the waiver test and thereby emphasized its importance: "[The fifth amend-
ment] addresses itself to the very issue of incriminating admissions of an accused
and resolves it by proscribing only compelled statements." Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478, 497 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
154 At the very least, Escobedo stands for this proposition and overrules, sub
silentio, Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303 (1912), and Wilson v. United States,
162 U.S. 613 (1896). Powers and Wilson are discussed at note 95 supra.
155 Tex. Code. Crim. P. art. 727 (Vernon 1941).
156 U.C.M.J. art. 31(b), 10 U.S.C. § 831(b) (1959).
157 As part of a research project the results of which are contained in an
unpublished paper entitled Police Interrogation and the Psychology of Confession,
Dr. David L. Sterling asked the Chiefs of Police in three Texas cities whether the
statutory requirement of a warning made it more difficult to obtain confessions. One
stated specifically that the statutory requirement had little effect; another indicated
the same result. The third stated that the requirement made it difficult to get con-
fessions. Id. at 60. The paper is on file in the Law Library of the Ohio State
University College of Law.
During thirty months as a trial lawyer in the Judge Advocate General's Corps,
I asked many investigators whether art. 31(b) was a detriment to obtaining con-
fessions. Invariably the answer was no.
158 A modified version of the question referred to in note 157 supra was answered
by eleven Chiefs of Police, all from different states. Nine stated that a warning
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The second answer is a more difficult one: Escobedo was not
advised of his constitutional privilege at that critical point in the
interrogation when he was accused by a co-defendant of firing the
fatal shots. Therefore, and without regard to any previous warn-
ing, he did not knowingly waive his privilege when, in an effort to
deny the accusation, he admitted incriminating knowledge of the
incident which was thereafter used to obtain additional information
from him."5 9 The factual component of this answer is correct, 60
and the legal component finds some support in Mr. Justice Gold-
berg's opinion:
At the time of his arrest and throughout the course of the in-
terrogation the police told petitioner that they had convincing
evidence that he had fired the fatal shots. Without informing him
of his absolute right to remain silent in the face of this accusation,
the police urged him to make a statement.' 6 '
In a footnote, Mr. Justice Goldberg added:
Although there is testimony in the record that petitioner and his
lawyer had previously discussed what petitioner should do in the
event of interrogation, there is no evidence that they discussed
what petitioner should, or could, do in the face of a false accu-
sation that he had fired the fatal bullets. 62
Finally, in a capsulization of the salient facts of the case, Mr. Jus-
tice Goldberg noted that "the police [had] not effectively warned
him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent." 163
would not make it more difficult to obtain confessions. Two disagreed. Sterling,
supra note 157, at 59. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion was that "even to inform
the suspect of his legal right to keep silent will prove an obstruction." Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 580 (1961).
The requirement of a warning suggests two problems neither of which will be
considered in this article: (1) does the privilege against self-incrimination prohibit
wiretapping, and (2) does the privilege render inadmissible a volunteered, threshold
confession made by one who is unaware of his constitutional rights? Regarding the
second question, it may be worth noting that in his summary of the important facts of
Escobedo, Mr. Justice Goldberg used the following words: "the police carry out a
process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements...
378 U.S. at 491.
159 Somewhat at odds with this theory is the common-law rule that fraudulently
induced consent to have sexual intercourse is a defense to a charge of rape. Perkins,
Criminal Law 124-26 (1957). On the other hand, fraudulently induced consent to
enter does constitute a breaking under the common law of burglary. Id. at 151-52.
160 Text accompanying note 125 supra.
161 Escobedo v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 478, 485 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
162 Id. at 485 n. 5. It may be inferred from this quotation that waiver will not
be presumed and that the government bears the burden of proving waiver.
163 Id. at 491. (Emphasis added.)
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If, in subsequent decisions, this answer to the waiver question
proves correct, then a tremendous restriction will be imposed upon
police interrogation. The entire thrust of police interrogation is
to put the defendant in an emotional state in which his instinct for
self-preservation is dulled 164 and (building upon the passage already
quoted)"" in which the defendant, through temporary unawareness,
abdicates his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.166
If, at the critical points in the interrogation, it is required that the
defendant be advised of his privilege of silence, the fluidity of the
interrogation will be interrupted, and the defendant, emboldened
by both the interruption and the advice, may remain silent. The
result will be that the police will obtain far fewer confessions than
they now obtain. In all probability, only the volunteered confession,
the confession made by one who, with knowledge of his rights,
desires to confess, will be admissible.-6T Under this interpretation
of Escobedo, the privilege will give far more protection than the
confessions rule.
The third answer is even more difficult: when he made his
abortive denial, Escobedo did not know that he was incriminating
himself because he did not realize the legal significance of his state-
ment. Consequently, he did not knowingly and intelligently waive
the privilege. Again, the factual component of the answer is cor-
rect 16' and, again, the legal component has a basis in Mr. Justice
Goldberg's opinion, As has already been noted, some emphasis
164 It is standard interrogation technique to give the interrogee no opportunity
for tension-relieving activities, Inbau & Reid, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions
8, 15-16 (1962) ; to give him no opportunity for repeated denials of the charge from
which denials he may derive strength, id. at 24-25; and to indicate disbelief in ex-
culpatory statements, see id. at 30-33.
105 Note 146 supra.
166 Recommended devices of interrogation include (1) inserting into a written
confession a statement that the defendant has been warned of his rights (but appar-
ently not giving a warning prior to interrogation), see Inbau & Reid, op. cit. supra
note 164, at 195; (2) pointing out to a suspect who refuses to talk that an infer-
ence of guilt may be drawn from silence, id. at 111; (3) minimizing the moral
seriousness of the offense, id. at 34-43, 87; (4) refraining from advising the subject
of the possible consequences of confessing, id. at 112; (5) exaggerating the serious-
ness of the offense in order to elicit a denial pregnant with an admission, id. at 62-64;
and (6) avoiding the impression that the interrogator wants a confession or convic-
tion, id. at 13-14.
167 In his dissenting opinion, Mr. justice White complained that the majority
opinion made inadmissible even a voluntary confession. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478, 495 (1964). There is, of course, a difference between a confession that is
voluntary within the meaning of the confessions rule and one that is volunteered.
See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 596 (1961); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322
U.S. 143, 160-61 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
168 See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 486 (1964).
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was placed on the facts that Escobedo was not "effectively warned
* . . [by the police] of his absolute constitutional right to remain
silent," 169 and that the pre-interrogation advice of counsel did
not include instructions regarding Escobedo's response to an accu-
sation that he had fired the gun. ° Moreover, it was observed that:
Petitioner, a layman, was undoubtedly unaware that under Illinois
law an admission of mere complicity was legally as damaging as
an admission of firing the fatal shots.... The guiding hand of
counsel was essential to advise petitioner of his rights in this
delicate situation.171
The most effective warning would, of course, advise the defendant
of the significance of what he was about to say, and that he had a
right to make no statement. Obviously, the police hoped that, in
response to the accusation of what might be regarded as a more
serious offense, Escobedo's denial would be pregnant with an admis-
sion of a lesser offense. Indeed, this is a recommended technique
of interrogation,'172 just as it is a recommended technique of interro-
gation to minimize the moral seriousness of the offense chargedY.7 3
In either case, it is quite likely that the defendant does not realize
the importance of what he is saying, and the police intend to cap-
italize on his unawareness. Consequently, if in subsequent cases
it is held that such unawareness vitiates waiver, a restriction of
enormous dimension will circumscribe police interrogation: recom-
mended and highly effective techniques of interrogation will be
forbidden. Again, the likely result will be the inadmissibility of
all confessions that are not volunteered, the privilege will give far
greater protection than the confessions rule, and effective interro-
gation will be constitutionally impermissible.
Of the three possible interpretations of Escobedo, the first
interpretation is certainly viable, unless Escobedo is meaningless
on the fifth-amendment point. 7 4 The important question, there-
fore, is whether either of the remaining interpretations will be
adopted by the Court. The question is important not only because
an answer will shed new light on the privilege 175 but also because
169 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 491 (1964).
170 Id. at 485 n. 5.
171 Id. at 486.
172 Inbau & Reid, op. cit. supra note 164, at 62-64.
173 Id. at 3443, 87.
174 Note 154 supra.
175 Analysis of the privilege in terms of waiver requires a definition of waiver.
To date, the Court has considered only a limited aspect of the problem. Notes 105-06
supra and accompanying text. Application of the privilege to police interrogation
will force the Court to redefine waiver.
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the answer will determine the role that the defendant's attorney
must be accorded during the police interrogation.
17 6
In his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice White reads the majority
opinion as standing for more than the first interpretation:
The Court may be concerned with a narrower matter: the un-
knowing defendant who responds to police questioning because he
mistakenly believes that he must and that his admissions wil not
be used against him. But this worry hardly calls for the broadside
the Court has now fired. The failure to inform an accused that
he need not answer and that his answers may be used against
him is very relevant indeed to whether the disclosures are com-
pelled. Cases in this Court, to say the least, have never placed
a premium on ignorance of constitutional rights.1 77
There is no indication in the dissenting opinion of the cases that Mr.
Justice White had in mind. One can guess, however, that they
concern the right to counsel because it is in those cases that the
Court has most vigilantly guarded against the waiver of constitu-
tional rights.1'7  For example, in Glasser v. United States,179 the
defendant, formerly an Assistant United States Attorney, objected
to the trial court's suggestion that his attorney be appointed to
represent a co-defendant. Thereafter, when the co-defendant indi-
cated that he would accept appointed counsel, the appointment was
made, and the defendant remained silent. The Court held that by
his silence the defendant did not waive his right to the effective
assistance and undivided loyalty of his attorney.8 0 In Von Moltke
v. Gillies,'8 ' the defendant, charged with wartime espionage, pur-
portedly waived her right to counsel and pleaded guilty. Four
judges were convinced that the record disclosed no intelligent
waiver; three judges held that the right had been waived; and
two judges found the record incomplete. Because a majority of the
Court was unwilling to affirm, the case was remanded for further
findings. However, the plurality opinion of Mr. Justice Black,
concurred in by Mr. Justice Douglas, merits consideration:
The fact that an accused may tell [the trial judge] that he is
informed of his right to counsel and desires to waive this right
does not automatically end the judge's responsibility. To be valid
such waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature
of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the
176 The attorney's role is discussed at note 228 infra.
177 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 499 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
178 See Comment, 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 591, 593 (1964).
179 315 U.S. 60 (1941).
180 Id. at 70-72.
181 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
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range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to
the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other
facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter. A
judge can make certain that an accused's professed waiver of
counsel is understandingly and wisely made only from a pene-
trating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances
under which such a plea is tendered.18 2
In Carnley v. Cochran,'s3 the Court, in holding that the trial judge
had not adequately protected the rights of an unrepresented de-
fendant, stated:
it appears that, while petitioner was advised [by the trial judge]
that he need not testify, he was not told what consequence might
follow if he did testify. He chose to testify and his criminal
record was brought out on his cross-examination. For defense
lawyers, it is commonplace to weigh the risk to the accused of the
revelation on cross-examination of a prior criminal record, when
advising an accused whether to take the stand in his own behalf.
For petitioner, the question had to be decided in ignorance of
this important consideration.184
If the right to counsel cases furnish an appropriate analogy,"8 " they
fully support the suggestion that Escobedo should be read for all
three interpretations of the waiver theory.8 8 This suggestion is
reinforced by the fact that in recent cases, including Escobedo, the
Court has surrounded the pre-trial stage with safeguards tradition-
ally associated only with the trial. 8 7  Insofar as the privilege is
182 Id. at 724.
183 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
184 Id. at 511. (Emphasis added.)
185 Conceptually, there appears to be no basis for denying the analogy. The
right to counsel is essential to the adversary system. The privilege is the foundation
of the accusatorial system. Because he is unaware of the plethora of problems arising
at a trial, the layman, absent specific advice, is unable to comprehend the scope and
importance of the right to counsel. Similarly, because he is unable to anticipate the
devices or techniques of interrogation, the layman may, without wanting to do so,
relinquish his privilege. The only basis for denying the analogy is that, although
society can tolerate a right to counsel at trial, an effective privilege against self-
incrimination at the police station would hamper law enforcement intolerably.
186 Additional support is found in the federal cases considering claims of waiver
or consent in the context of search and seizure. Federal courts have carefully evalu-
ated such claims and have resolved all doubts against waiver. See Day & Berkman,
"Search and Seizure and the Exclusionary Rule: A Re-Examination in the Wake of
Mapp v. Ohio," 13 W. Res. L. Rev. 56, 80-81 (1961); Kamisar, "Illegal Searches
or Seizures and Contemporaneous Incriminating Statements: A Dialogue on a Neg-
lected Area of Criminal Procedure," 1961 U. Ill. L.F. 78, 117-18.
187 In Escobedo it was stated that a requirement of counsel at the interrogation
stage makes effective the right to representation by counsel at trial. Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 486-488 (1964). The same point was made in Massiah v.
United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964).
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concerned, the accused need not testify for any purpose unless he
chooses to do so. He cannot be called as a witness without his
consent.-"" Before consenting to testify, he will have been primed
by his attorney for cross-examination. Moreover, the attorney can
by objection protect his client against trick questions and abusive
cross-examination. If the substance of these safeguards is available
at the police interrogation stage, the privilege has been accorded all
of the interpretations discussed above, and productive police inter-
rogation is, in theory, at an end. 89
However, once again the words "in theory" are relevant. It is
quite likely that state and lower federal courts will attempt to
narrow the scope of Escobedo. Impetus for a restrictive interpre-
tation will undoubtedly come from the impact of a broad interpreta-
tion. Because the possibilities of restrictive interpretation must be
assessed on the basis of the opinion as a whole, a consideration of
these possibilities will be deferred until the right-to-counsel aspect
has been discussed.190 For now, it is sufficient to observe that the
critical question for future resolution is this: how effective a privi-
lege against self-incrimination does a majority of the present Court
want? The answer to that question will resolve the constitutional
theory of police interrogation.
V. RIGHiT To COUNSEL
In 1958, in the cases of Crooker v. California 9I and Cicenia
v. Lagay,92 the Court was faced with the question of whether there
was a constitutional right to counsel at the police station. In
Crooker, the defendant was a thirty-one-year old college graduate
who, during one year of law school, had studied criminal law. Prior
188 8 Wigmore § 2268, at 406-8. This immunity has been attributed to (1) the
accused's common law, testimonial disqualification; (2) the prosecution's opportunity
to cross-eaamine the accused if he chooses to testify; (3) the fact that, if the prosecu-
tion were permitted to call the accused as a witness in order to ascertain whether he
would claim the privilege, the claim of privilege would suggest guilt; and (4) statu-
tory prohibition. Id. at 407-8. It must be admitted that none of these reasons is par-
ticularly relevant to interrogation at the police station. However, a non-party witness
also may claim a privilege. Although he has no right not to be called, and although
questions may be put to him, he may refuse to give any incriminating answer. Id. at
402-03.
189 Under the confessions rule, a confession is inadmissible if obtained as the
result of a promise of benefit. Maguire, "'Involuntary' Confessions," 31 Tul. L. Rev.
125, 136 (1956). In such a case it might be argued that the interrogee has chosen
to make the disclosure and, assuming knowledge of the privilege, has therefore waived
the privilege. If this argument is tenable, the privilege would not in some cases oust
the confessions rule.
190 See 494-95 infra.
191 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
192 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
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to interrogation, he was advised by a policeman of his privilege
against self-incrimination. After the police had denied his request to
consult a named attorney, he was interrogated. By answering some
questions and refusing to answer others he indicated that he under-
stood his privilege. Ultimately he confessed to murder. The Court,
in a five-to-four decision, first held the confession to be voluntary.193
Then, applying the prevailing standard of Betts v. Brady,94 the
Court held that the confession was not inadmissible for want of
counsel.1'95 The Court rejected as too broad the defendant's argu-
ment that the right to counsel was absolute and independent of
the existence of special circumstances. This argument, the Court
observed, would result in the invalidation of a conviction even
though the defendant did not confess. 98 The test applied by the
Court was whether the existence of special circumstances at the
interrogation so prejudiced the defendent at his trial as to require
the presence of counsel at the interrogation.197 Finding no special
circumstances, the Court held the confession admissible. Quite
clearly, the Court evaluated the right to counsel as of the outset of
the interrogation, and the fact that the defendant thereafter con-
fessed was not regarded as a special circumstance.
In Cicenia, decided on the same day as Crooker, the Court held
that a confession was not rendered inadmissible by a refusal to
permit the defendant to consult retained counsel.""8 After Crooker
and Cicenia, there was every reason to believe that the admissibil-
ity of a confession was to be tested by the confessions rule and not
by a requirement of counsel. Although the absence of counsel was,
under the confessions rule, relevant to a determination of volun-
tariness, 99 the absence of counsel was not per se an invalidating
factor.
One year later, in Spano v. New York, °0 a capital case, a
unanimous Court held inadmissible a post-indictment confession
obtained under pressure after the police had refused to permit the
defendant to consult his retained lawyer. Chief Justice Warren, a
dissenter in Crooker and Cicenia, wrote the majority opinion, the
rationale of which was that the confessions rule had been vio-
lated.2 01 However, Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, also dissenters
193 357 U.S. at 438.
194 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
195 Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 440-41 (1958).
106 Id. at 440.
'97 Id. at 439-40.
198 Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 'U.S. 504, 509-10 (1958).
199 Id. at 509. See Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567 (1958).
200 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
201 Id. at 320.
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in Crooker and Cicenia,202 and Justice Stewart concurred on the
basis of a right-to-counsel theory. Said Mr. Justice Stewart:
Under our system of justice an indictment is supposed to be
followed by an arraignment and a trial. At every stage in those
proceedings the accused has an absolute right to a lawyer's help
if the case is one in which a death sentence may be imposed.
Indeed the right to the assistance of counsel whom the accused
has himself retained is absolute, whatever the offense for which
he is on trial.203
Although Spano was decided under the confessions rule, a majority
of the Court-Mr. Justice Stewart and the dissenters in Crooker
and Cicenia-now favored a sixth-amendment theory of the admis-
sibility of post-indictment confessions. A small breach had been
made in the wall of Crooker and Cicenia. The breach was enlarged
a bit in Gideon v. Wainwriglkt.204 Crooker and Cicenia had been
decided during the ascendancy of Betts v. Brady. Indeed, the spe-
cial circumstances test of Betts was an important part of the
Crooker rationale.205 The overruling of Betts in Gideon thus sapped
Crooker and Cicenia of more of their vitality.
Another blow was delivered toward the end of the 1963 term
in Massiak v. United States20° when the Court held inadmissible,
specifically on sixth-amendment grounds, incriminating statements
obtained after indictment and in the absence of retained counsel.
Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for a six-judge majority, relied on his
concurring opinion in Spano:
It was said that a Constitution which guarantees a defendant the
aid of counsel at . . . trial could surely vouchsafe no less to an
indicted defendant under interrogation by the police in a com-
pletely extrajudicial proceeding. Anything less, it was said [by
Mr. Justice Douglas in a separate concurring opinion], might
deny a defendant 'effective representation by counsel at the only
stage when legal aid and advice would help him.' 207
By its stress on the need for counsel at the pre-trial stage and on
the relationship between representation by counsel at trial and at
the pre-trial stage, the rationale of Massiak is broad enough to en-
202 Mr. Justice Brennan did not participate in Cicenia.
203 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 327 (1959) (concurring opinion). (Cita-
tions omitted.)
204 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
205 See note 194 supra and accompanying text.
206 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
207 Id. at 204. The same result was reached in Lee v. United States, 322 F2d
770 (5th Cir. 1963), noted in 42 Texas L. Rev. 898 (1964). But see Lyles v. Beto,
329 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1964), vacated and remanded, 85 Sup. Ct. 613 (1965).
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compass a right to appointed counsel as well as to retained counsel.
If Gideon is added to Massiahl, it is clear that a post-indictment
confession is inadmissible whether counsel is absent as the result of
an investigative end-run, as in Massiah, or whether counsel is ab-
sent because he has not yet been appointed.
A question left unanswered by Massiak is whether a post-in-
dictment confession is inadmissible solely for the reason that it was
elicited in the absence of counsel. In Massiak, the confession was
obtained by electronic eavesdropping, and the defendant did not
know that his words were being recorded by government agents.
If his attorney had advised him not to make any statements, the
advice was nullified not only by the defendant's willingness to
talk but also by the government's use of electronic deception. Con-
sequently, on its facts Massiak was a fairly strong case for an ex-
tension of the right to counsel. The question remains, however,
whether the statements would have been inadmissible if Massiah
had known that his words were being recorded. In his dissenting
opinion, Mr. Justice White argued that the test of admissibility
should continue to be one of voluntariness under the confessions
rule.208 As viewed by the dissenting opinion, the majority opinion
emphasized only the absence of counsel and not the defendant's
knowledge. This interpretation is buttressed by the majority's reli-
ance on Spano, a case in which the defendant was interrogated at
the police station in the absence of his attorney but after his attor-
ney had warned him not to make any statements.2 09 Obviously,
Spano knew that he was speaking to law enforcement officers. Thus,
there is a substantial basis for predicting the inadmissibility of all
post-indictment confessions obtained by agents of the state in the
absence of counsel. Because the presence of counsel will make it
impossible to obtain a confession, the result of Massiak, as a prac-
tical matter, is that all post-indictment confessions are inadmissible.
However, and also as a practical matter, it is unlikely that Massiak
will have much impact on criminal procedure. Excepting cases in
which an indictment is based on weak evidence or in which the
government needs additional information for the apprehension of
co-defendants,210 there is no need for post-indictment interrogation.
From an investigative standpoint, the critical stage is the police
interrogation prior to preliminary examination by a committing
208 377 U.S. at 210. See State v. McLeod, 1 Ohio St. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 349
(1964).
209 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 317 (1959).
210 In Massiah, the government argued the necessity of apprehending codefendants.
Mr. Justice Stewart's answer was that regardless of necessity, the defendant's con-
fession was inadmissible at his trial. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206-07
(1964).
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magistrate. Massiak does not compel the conclusion that there is
an absolute right to counsel at that stage. Escobedo, however, prob-
ably does.
The facts of Escobedo have already been stated in detail. For
present purposes, it is sufficient to note that Escobedo bears a strik-
ing factual resemblance to Cicenia. In both cases, counsel had been
retained prior to interrogation; the interrogation was conducted
in the absence of counsel; the police denied the defendant's requests
to see counsel; and counsel's efforts to see his client were similarly
rebuffed. In Cicenia, the confession was held admissible. In Esco-
bedo, it was held inadmissible:
We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun
to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into
police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that
lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has
requested and has been denied an opportunity to consult with his
lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his
absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has
been denied 'the Assistance of Counsel' in violation of the Sixth
Amendment . . . and that no statement elicited by the police
during the interrogation may be used against him at a criminal
trial.211
This holding, incorporating some of the important facts of the
case, can be taken as a hint that the right to counsel at the police
station is to be determined by a test of special circumstances
analogous to the test announced in Betts v. Brady regarding
counsel at trial.212 The Betts test "had a troubled journey through-
211 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964). On the basis of state
law, the New York Court of Appeals has held inadmissible a confession obtained
before preliminary examination and after retained counsel was prohibited by the
police from seeing the defendant. People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d
628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963), noted in 13 Buffalo L. Rev. 498 (1964); 52 Geo.
L.J. 629 (1964).
212 A similar suggestion may be inferred from Mr. Justice Goldberg's state-
ment that the police interrogation in Escobedo was as critical a stage in the pro-
ceedings as the preliminary hearing in White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963),
and the arraignment in Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961). However, although
Hamilton was decided before Gideon, and although White specifically relied on
Hamilton, the cases do not represent an application of the special circumstances test.
To the contrary, Bells was clearly on the wane, and in neither White nor Hamilton
did the Court require any showing of prejudice. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 350 (1963) (Harlan, J.); Kamisar & Choper, "The Right to Counsel in
Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations," 48 Minn. L. Rev.
1, 57 (1963). However, Hamilton and White were capital cases, and it may be asked
whether they "presage a revival of the capital-noncapital dichotomy for pre-trial
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out the years" and existed "in form while its substance [was
being] substantially and steadily eroded." 213 It was discarded in
Gideon v. Wainwright 14 in favor of an absolute right to be repre-
sented by counsel at trial. Consequently, the first question raised
by Escobedo is whether the right to counsel at the police station
is absolute (in the sense of excluding a confession obtained in the
absence of counsel if the right has not been waived) or whether the
right to counsel depends on a search for elusive special circum-
stances. In spite of the hint referred to above, Mr. Justice Gold-
berg's opinion supports a conclusion that the right is absolute.
Two main themes run through the opinion. The first is that
the right to counsel at the police station makes effective the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. The second is that the right to
counsel at the police station makes effective the right to counsel
at trial. If the right to counsel is evaluated only in the context of
the privilege, then whether the right to counsel is absolute depends
upon the meaning of the privilege and the necessity for protection
of the privilege through the presence of counsel. The meaning of
the privilege has already been considered and three interpretations
have been suggested: that the defendant is entitled to a warning at
the outset of the interrogation; that he is entitled to a warning at
the critical point in the interrogation; and that he is entitled to
know the legal significance of what the police expect him to say.
Under the first interpretation, it is difficult to argue that the pres-
ence of counsel is necessary for protection of the privilege. It is
not at all unlikely that an understandable warning could and would
be given before the interrogation by someone other than coun-
sel-a policeman, for example.215 Thus, if the defendant is entitled
to a warning only at the beginning of interrogation and if the right
to counsel is based on this interpretation of the privilege, the pres-
ence of counsel is not necessary, the right to counsel is not absolute,
and Escobedo is nothing more than a grand illusion.
Under the second and third interpretations of the privilege,
proceedings." Kamisar & Choper, supra at 58. A negative answer is suggested by
the fact that Escobedo was a non-capital case in that the defendant was sentenced
to imprisonment for twenty years. People v. Escobedo, 28 l12d 41, 42, 190 N.E2d
825, 826 (1963).
An inference that Escobedo does not represent an application of the special cir-
cumstances test may be derived from the fact that the coercive aspects of the interroga-
tion played no part in the rationale.
213 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 350 (1963) (Harlan, J.).
214 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963).
215 During my experience as a military trial-attorney, I found that most of my
confessor-clients did understand the warning given to them pursuant to U.C.M.J.
art. 31(b), 10 U.S.C. § 831(b) (1959).
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the communication could be made by someone other than counsel.
In theory, therefore, the right to counsel would not be absolute.
However, it is unlikely that either the second or the third com-
munication would be made by anyone other than counsel to the
detriment of productive interrogation. Consequently, as a practical
matter, the right to counsel would be absolute. As has been sug-
gested above,216 a strong argument can be made that all three
interpretations of the privilege are correct. Accordingly, the right
to counsel would be absolute. However, until the Court resolves
the problem of interpreting the privilege, the right to counsel, to
the extent that it depends on the privilege, must remain in some
doubt.
In the second theme that runs through Mr. Justice Goldberg's
opinion, the right to counsel at the police station is regarded as
protecting the right to counsel at trial:
This was the 'stage when legal aid and advice' were most critical
to petitioner. It was a stage surely as critical as was the arraign-
ment in Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, and the preliminary
hearing in White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59. What happened at
this interrogation could certainly 'affect the whole trial' since
rights 'may be as irretrievably lost, if not then and there asserted,
as they are when an accused represented by counsel waives a
right for strategic purposes.' . . .
In Gideon v. Wainwright, we held that every person accused
of a crime, whether state or federal, is entitled to a lawyer at
trial. The rule sought by the State here, however, would make the
trial no more than an appeal from the interrogation; and the
'right to use counsel at the formal trial [would be] a very hollow
thing [if], for all practical purposes, the conviction is already
assured by pre-trial examination.' 21 7
Under this view of right to counsel at the police station, it is obvious
that the right must be regarded as absolute. Moreover, the anal-
ogy between interrogation and trial is highly relevant to an inter-
pretation of the privilege. At the trial, if the defendant cannot
help himself by testifying, competent counsel will insist that he
exercise his privilege. Even if the defendant waives his privilege,
he will be thoroughly prepared for direct examination and he will
be protected from improper cross-examination by the presence of
counsel. The analogy between interrogation and trial thus suggests
that the privilege be given the second and third interpretations
discussed above. As has already been noted, to the extent that the
210 Supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
217 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 486-87 (1964). (Original brackets.)
(Some citations omitted.)
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right to counsel is regarded as protecting the privilege, the right
must be treated as absolute under either of these interpretations.
Consequently, the problem presented by Escobedo may be stated
as follows: at the police station is the defendant entitled only to
a warning of his rights (by anyone) at the outset of interrogation
or is he entitled to all of the safeguards provided by the presence
of counsel at trial? On the basis of Escobedo alone, it is reasonable
to predict that a majority of the present Court espouses the trial
analogy, and a consideration of the antecedents to Escobedo dic-
tates the same answer.
In Crooker v. California,21s it will be remembered, the defend-
ant had studied law for one year and his program included a course
in criminal law. Toward the beginning of the interrogation, he was
advised by a police lieutenant that he need not say anything.
Apparently both before and after the warning he refused to answer
certain questions. In spite of Crooker's awareness of his rights,
four judges, all of whom concurred in Escobedo, would have held
the confession inadmissible because it had been obtained in the
absence of counsel. Writing for the dissenters, Mr. Justice Douglas
insisted that "the right to have counsel at the pretrial stage is
often necessary to give meaning and protection to the right to be
heard at the trial itself." 210 In addition, said Mr. Justice Douglas,
the presence of counsel would at least minimize two problems
inhering in the interrogation process: the defendant's inability
to prove coercion in the face of contradictory testimony by his
interrogator, and the risk that, at the trial, the interrogator might
inaccurately relate the substance of an oral confession.220 The dis-
senting opinion in Crooker was cited in the brief dissenting opinion
in Cicenia v. Lagay.221
In Ashdown v. Utak,222 decided on the same day as Crooker,
the defendant was taken into custody for interrogation and was
advised that she did not have to make a statement and that she
had a right to counsel. She did not request counsel. While she
was being interrogated, two relatives were denied permission to
see her. In an opinion in which the absence of counsel was men-
tioned but not discussed, seven judges held the confession voluntary
and admissible. Justices Douglas and Black, relying on their dissent
in Crooker, dissented in an opinion in which it was asserted that
218 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
219 Id. at 443.
220 Id. at 443-44.
221 357 U.S. 504, 512 (1958).
222 357 U.S. 426 (1958).
[Vol. 25
POLICE INTERROGATION
the record did not establish either that counsel had been waived
or that the defendant "had elected to talk." 223
In Spano v. New York, 24 the link between counsel at the
police station and counsel at the trial was clearly articulated in
the concurring opinions of Justices Douglas and Stewart. Without
referring to the privilege against self-incrimination, Mr. Justice
Douglas stated:
This is a case of an accused, who is scheduled to be tried by ajudge and jury, being tried in a preliminary way by the police.
This is a kangaroo court procedure whereby the police produce
the vital evidence in the form of a confession which is useful or
necessary to obtain a conviction. They in effect deny him effective
representation by counsel. 225
And Mr. Justice Stewart noted that "our Constitution guarantees
the assistance of counsel to a man on trial for his life .... Surely a
Constitution which promises that much can vouchsafe no less to the
same man under midnight inquisition in the squad room of a police
station." 22 As was previously discussed, the same link between
counsel at interrogation and counsel at trial was emphasized in
Massiak v. United States.2 7
Considered in the light of its antecedents, Escobedo must be
taken as establishing at the interrogation stage all of the safeguards
provided by the presence of counsel at trial.22- However, it should
be noted that in Cicenia, Spano, and Escobedo the defendant had
retained counsel prior to interrogation and had requested permission
to consult counsel during the interrogation. In Crooker, the de-
fendant had demanded to see a named attorney. In none of the
cases, therefore, would it have been necessary for the state to pro-
223 Id. at 432.
224 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
225 Id. at 325.
228 Id. at 327.
227 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
228 In Escobedo, Mr. Justice Goldberg sought to distinguish Crooker by com-
paring the education of the respective defendants and by noting that Crooker had
been warned of his rights. However, he also stated that "to the extent that Cicenia
or Crooker may be inconsistent with the principles announced today, they are not
to be regarded by controlling." Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964).
Because of the factual similarity between Escobedo and Cicenia, it may be stated
with confidence that the Court has, in effect, overruled both Cicenia and Crooker.
If the right to counsel at the police station is absolute, and if the presence of
counsel is required in order to effectuate the privilege against self-incrimination, it
follows that counsel must be permitted to attend the entire interrogation and to inter-
rupt the interrogation in order to warn his client. The likely result is that the police
will not even attempt an interrogation if counsel is present.
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vide counsel at the interrogation. Thus, the second question raised
by Escobedo is whether an indigent defendant is entitled to counsel
upon request. An affirmative answer is fully supported by Gideon v.
Wainwright 229 and by the rationale of Escobedo that the presence
of counsel at the interrogation makes effective both the right to
representation by counsel at trial and the privilege against self-
incrimination. Neither Gideon nor the rationale of Escobedo per-
mits any meaningful distinction between the indigent and the
affluent.
In Escobedo, as in Crooker, Cicenia and Spano, the defendant
specifically requested an opportunity to consult counsel. Is such
a request essential, or will silence be taken as a waiver? If the
defendant knows that he has a right to consult counsel, will a
waiver be inferred from his silence or from a statement that he does
not desire counsel? The opinion in Escobedo suggests only the
following: if the right to counsel is as important as Mr. Justice
Goldberg indicates, the Court will not be quick to draw inferences
of waiver. Clearly, if the defendant is unaware of his rights, a
request is not essential and silence will not be taken as a waiver.
This conclusion follows from the right-to-counsel cases discussed
previously as an analogue to the privilege/waiver problem.230
Moreover, as the plurality opinion in Von Moltke v. Gillies231
demonstrates, even if the defendant is aware of the right to counsel
and purports to waive it, the waiver will be ineffective unless the
defendant is aware of the importance and scope of the assistance
of counsel. If the record discloses only a naked awareness of the
right, it is highly unlikely that a waiver will be inferred.
In his dissenting opinion in Escobedo, Mr. Justice Stewart
argued that there was no right to counsel prior to indictment:
[T]he institution of formal, meaningful judicial proceedings by
way of indictment, information, or arraignment marks the point at
which a criminal investigation has ended and adversary litigative
proceedings have commenced. It is at this point that the con-
stitutional guarantees attach which pertain to a criminal trial.
Among those guarantees . . . is the guarantee of the assistance
of counsel.232
In essence, Mr. Justice Stewart relied on the specific terminology
of the sixth amendment ("criminal prosecutions") and insisted that
229 This point was explicitly recognized in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
White. 378 U.S. 478, 495.
230 Supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text.
281 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
232 378 U.S. at 493-94.
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the prosecution began only with indictment. Because Mr. Justice
Stewart had written the opinion in Massiak, an anticipatory reply
from Mr. Justice Goldberg was necessary. Leading from strength,
Mr. Justice Goldberg noted that in Massiak considerable emphasis
had been placed on the relationship between effective representa-
tion at trial and representation at pre-trial stages. If, in order to
insure effective representation at trial, it is necessary to have coun-
sel after indictment and before trial, it is no less necessary to have
counsel at the police station before indictment. Indeed, because
post-indictment interrogation is unusual and pre-indictment inter-
rogation is typical, from the defendant's standpoint it is far more
important to have counsel at the police station. In short, Mr.
Justice Stewart had painted himself into a comer in Massiah, from
which he could extricate himself only by a highly formalistic read-
ing of the sixth amendment. Moreover, Mr. Justice Stewart's
position is weak for two additional reasons, neither of which was
urged by Mr. Justice Goldberg. The first is that, although the
phraseology of the fifth amendment limits the privilege against
self-incrimination to a criminal case, the Court has applied the
privilege to such pre-indictment procedures as legislative inquiries 283
and grand-jury investigations. 234 If an effective privilege can be
achieved only through the presence of counsel, the right to counsel
must arise prior to indictment. The second reason is that the
Court had already held that a right to counsel existed at a pre-
indictment stage. In White v. Maryland,235 a capital case, the
defendant, unrepresented by counsel, pleaded guilty at the pre-
liminary hearing. Although this plea was not controlling for pur-
poses of the trial, it was admitted as evidence. In a unanimous
per curiam decision, the Court held that the preliminary examina-
tion was a critical stage in the proceeding, that the defendant should
have had counsel, and that the plea was inadmissible as evidence
of guilt.
233 8 Wigmore § 2252, at 328 n. 25.
234 Id. at 328 n. 24.
235 373 U.S. 59 (1963). Mr. Justice Goldberg did cite White, but he did not
stress that White involved a pre-indictment stage.
The citation of White and a subsequent reference, in a slightly different context,
to Ex parte Sullivan, 107 F. Supp. 514 (D. Utah 1952), decision after conditional
remand, 126 F. Supp. 564 (1954), reversed sub nora. Utah v. Sullivan, 227 F.2d 511
(10th Cir. 1955), cert. denied sub nom. Braasch v. Utah, 350 U.S. 973 (1956), raise
the question whether there is an absolute right to counsel at the preliminary hearing.
A negative answer may be based upon the belief that, in the ordinary case, the pre-
liminary hearing is merely a ritual rather than a critical stage in the proceedings.
An affirmative answer may be based on the following: (1) the preliminary hearing
is one of the few discovery devices available to a defendant, but cf. Cicenia v. Lagay,
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Had Mr. Justice Goldberg been content to rely on the trial
analogy, he could have been criticized only for not making a com-
plete argument. However, he was not content. In what appears
to be an attempt to establish a factual, as well as doctrinal, analogy
between Escobedo and Massiak, he stated:
The interrogation here was conducted before petitioner was
formally indicted. But in the context of this case, that fact should
make no difference. When petitioner requested, and was denied,
an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, the investigation had
ceased to be a general investigation of 'an unsolved crime.'
Petitioner had become the accused, and the purpose of the inter-
rogation was to get him to confess his guilt despite his constitu-
tional right not to do so. . . . It would exalt form over substance
to make the right to counsel, under these circumstances, depend
on whether at the time of the interrogation, the authorities had
secured a formal indictment. Petitioner had, for all practical
purposes, already been charged with murder.236
Two restrictive interpretations may be given to this factually
correct 237 statement. First, it may be said that the Escobedo rule
does not apply if the interrogee has been arrested only "on sus-
picion." This statement, however, collides with the Wong Sun
rule.238 The words "on suspicion" suggest an arrest that is uncon-
stitutional for want of probable cause. 239 In such a case it is likely
that a subsequent confession is inadmissible on fourth-amendment
grounds. 240 Consequently, even if the first interpretation is valid, it
still leads to a cul-de-sac of inadmissibility.
357 U.S. 504, 510 (1958); (2) an unrepresented defendant may prejudice his case
by what he does at the preliminary hearing, see Nance v. United States, 299 F2d
122 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (defendant made admissions inadvertently) ; and (3) the Court
should not speculate as to prejudice.
236 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485-86 (1964). In his final summary of
the case, Mr. Justice Goldberg noted that the investigation had "begun to focus on
a particular suspect." Id. at 490.
237 The statement is factually correct because, shortly before the second arrest,
the defendant was implicated in the killing by DiGerlando, who eventually accused
the defendant of firing the murder weapon. At the time of the interrogation, the
defendant was a "prime!' suspect. People v. Escobedo, 28 I11.2d 41, 43, 190 N.E2d
825, 826 (1963).
23 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
239 See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959).
240 Supra note 70. Even in the absence of the Wong Su exclusionary rule, it is
highly unlikely that the Court would permit the police to avoid Escobedo by relying
on the additional illegality of an unconstitutional arrest. In this regard, it is interest-
ing to note that prior to Mallory, it was sometimes argued that an unreasonable delay
was excused by the fact that the defendant had been arrested without probable cause
and that the evidence was therefore insufficient to support a charge. See Hearings on
S. Res. 234 before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Commit-
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The second interpretation is that Escobedo applies only if there
is "strong" probable cause to believe that the interrogee committed
the offense. It would follow that, although Wong Sun and Escobedo
ride tandem in some cases, neither would govern a case in which
only "ordinary" probable cause existed. This interpretation prob-
ably involves an unworkable distinction in terms of quanta of prob-
able cause. Even if the distinction is workable, at some point in
the interrogation "strong" probable cause must arise because, by
hypothesis, the interrogee will give some indication of a willingness
to confess. At that point, the Escobedo rule would apply. The sec-
ond interpretation, therefore, results only in delayed application. 41
A third interpretation may be given to Mr. Justice Goldberg's
statement. It is that the statement is meaningless. If the right to
counsel at the police station preserves the right to representation at
trial and makes effective the privilege against self-incrimination,
it is illogical to distinguish the case of the prime suspect from the
case of any other suspect. In each case the right to counsel serves
the same purpose in the same way. To suggest that the right to
counsel arises only when the investigation begins to focus on the
interogee is to play hocus-focus with the right to counsel and to
obliterate the very arguments urged to support the result in
Escobedo. Consequently, although it may be inferred from Mr.
Justice Goldberg's statement that only a prime suspect has a con-
stitutional right to counsel, the inference should be ignored.
In Haynes v. Washington, it was observed by way of disclaimer
that ". . . detection and solution of crime is, at best, a difficult
and arduous task requiring determination and persistence ...
[W]e do not mean to suggest that all interrogation of witnesses
and suspects is impermissible." 242 But after Wong Sun, Malloy,
and Escobedo, what is the scope of permissible interrogation? In
all probability, Wong Sun severely limits the class of persons who
may be interrogated. If the interrogee is within the class, Malloy
tee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 766-67 (1958) (statement by Professor Yale
Kamlsar).
241 The same result would also obtain under the first interpretation. The vice
of delayed application is that it permits the police to get some incriminating informa-
tion in the absence of counsel. This same vice prevailed under the English judges'
Rules prior to their amendment in 1964. Under the old rules, a suspect could be
questioned until the interrogator decided to charge him with an offense. At that
point, it was required that the interrogator warn the suspect of his privilege of
silence. Brownlie, "Police Questioning, Custody and Caution," [1960] Crim. L. Rev.
298, 306-07. Under the amended rules, a warning must be given if the interrogator
has reasonable ground to suspect that the interrogee has committed an offense. Home
Office Circular No. 31/1964, January, 1964.
242 Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514-15 (1963).
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and Escobedo give him the privilege against self-incrimination, and
Escobedo makes it effective 'through a requirement of counsel. The
total theoretical impact of these cases is that productive police
interrogation is a dead letter. Unless the defendant wants to con-
fess, his natural reluctance must be overcome. To this extent,
police interrogation is, and has to be, inherently coercive.243 Effec-
tive coercion comprehends increased pressure by the interrogator
and diminished resistance on the part of the person interrogated.
But pressure is impermissible under the privilege and diminished
resistance is unlikely if counsel is present. Through a series of
cases, each of which chips away at the scope of permissible inter-
rogation,"the Court has held, in effect, that productive interrogation
is impermissible.244
It is unlikely, however, that the theoretical impact will be felt
immediately in practice. The opinion in Escobedo simply furnishes
too many possibilities for convenient avoidance, each of which has
to be resolved through litigation. It is to be expected that law
enforcement officers, state courts, and lower federal courts will seize
upon each of the ambiguities in Escobedo as a basis for distinction.
In one case the basis will be that the police advised the defendant
of his rights at the outset of interrogation. In another case it will
be that the defendant was a mere suspect when he confessed. In
still another case the basis will be that coercive circumstances were
absent (remember that Escobedo could have been decided under
the confessions rule) or that the defendant voluntarily waived his
privilege and his right to counsel.245 All in all, the cases will resemble
243 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 161 (1944) (dissenting opinion). If
police interrogation is inherently coercive, it may be argued that police interrogation
per se constitutes an impermissible compulsion to self-incrimination. Under this argu-
ment, the test of compulsion would afford almost as much protection as the test of
waiver.
244 "To what extent should police effectiveness be the ultimate test? The com-
peting values of personal liberty are not entirely based on pragmatic reasoning."
Weisberg, "Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View," in Police
Power and Individual Freedom 153, 172 (Sowle ed. 1962).
245 After the above text was written, it was held in Jackson v. United States,
337 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (2-1), that a confession was admissible under the
following circumstances: the defendant committed murder in the District of Columbia,
fled to New York, and was arrested there by FBI agents. They advised him that
he did not have to make a statement and that he was entitled to counsel. Thereafter,
the same advice was given by a United States Commissioner. About two hours later,
District of Columbia police arrived and advised the defendant that he did not have
to make a statement. After a non-coercive interrogation, the defendant confessed. In
holding the confession admissible, the court stressed the advice regarding the privilege
and the absence of coercion. Escobedo was distinguished on the ground that no request
for counsel had been made in the Jackson case. Accord, United States v. Konigsberg,
336 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1964), petlition for cert. filed, 33 U.S.L. Week 3166 (U.S.
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in tenor those lower federal court decisions in the wake of McNabb
in which it was held that the McNabb rule applied only if some
coercion was present.24 They will also resemble in tenor those
decisions in the wake of Mallory in which it was held that a par-
ticular delay was reasonable even though a confession was obtained
during that period and even though it was likely that the delay
was motivated by a desire to interrogate. 7  Undoubtedly, Bsco-
bedo will be resisted as McNabb and Mallory were resisted.
McNabb was decided in 1943. After twenty-one years and three sub-
sequent clarifying Supreme Court decisions,24s the battle is still
being fought. Escobedo, therefore, can hardly be regarded as more
than a skirmish.249
Nov. 3, 1964) (No. 596) (Escobedo limited to its facts) ; Mitchell v. Stephens, 232 F.
Supp. 497 (E.D. Ark. 1964); CM 410956, Bostic, DA Pam 27-101-167 (64 JALS
167/5) (1964) ; People v. Hartgraves- Ill2d-, 202 N.E.2d 33 (1964) ; Hayden
v. State,-Ind.----, 201 N.E.2d 329 (1964); People v. Agar,--N.Y.S. 2d- (Sup.
Ct. Queens Co. 1964) ; State v. Puckett, 201 N.E2d 86 (Ohio C.P. 1964).
In Long v. United States, 338 F2d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (per curiam),
the court held statements volunteered to police officers in the police station corridor
could not be excluded because defendant was without benefit of counsel. The court
noted that neither a court nor a legislature has forbidden the admission of inculpatory
statements voluntarily offered out of the presence of counsel.
In People v. Dorado,--Cal. 2d- , 394 P2d 952, 40 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1964),
rehearing granted, 40 Cal. Rptr. issue No. 10, I (Nov. 16, 1964), the California
Supreme Court applied Escobedo to a case in which the defendant did not request
counsel. Relying on such cases as Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962), the
court held that a waiver could not be inferred from the absence of a request. Accord,
Queen v. United States, 335 F2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1964), decided by a panel different
from the panel that decided Jackson. Contra, State v. McLeod, supra note 208.
In Galarza Cruz v. Delgado, 233 F. Supp. 944 (D.P.R. 1964), defendant brought
a habeas corpus action charging that certain sworn statements made before a judge
should not have been admitted into evidence where the judge failed to advise him of
his right to counsel at that preliminary stage of the proceedings. The court held
the confession inadmissible applying Massiah and Escobedo.
In Johnson v. United States, No. 18,243, D.C. Cir., Oct. 15, 1964 (3-0), the
court held on the basis of Escobedo and Queen v. United States, supra, that a con-
fession obtained after continuance of a preliminary hearing but before counsel had
been retained could not be used for impeachment purposes to rebut defendant's
testimony. The court refused to apply the exception as set forth in Walder v. United
States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954), distinguishing Walder in its facts.
246 The cases are collected in Hogan & Snee, "The McNabb-Mallory Rule:
Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue," 47 Geo. L.J. 1, 6 n. 21 (1958).
247 The cases are collected in Kamisar & Choper, supra note 212, at 44 n. 187;
Comment, 68 Yale L.J. 1003, 1015-20 (1959).
248 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); Upshaw v. United States,
335 U.S. 410 (1948) ; United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944).
249 See Comment, 73 Yale L.J. 1000, 1052-53 (1964).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court must have decided kscobedo with full
realization that police interrogation is essential to the solution of
some crimes and that, if the theory of Escobedo is ever translated
into action, police interrogation is at an end. Why was the Court
ready to sacrifice police interrogation? The answer to this question
involves two factors: dissatisfaction with the operation of the con-
fessions rule, and a recognition of the inconsistency of giving to the
accused at trial a privilege against self-incrimination made effective
by the presence of counsel, and, at the same time, at the critical stage
of police interrogation, denying to the accused both the full reach of
the privilege and the protection of counsel.250
Insofar as counsel is concerned, and without regard to the
privilege, it is apparent that Escobedo represents a shift in emphasis.
At the trial the participation of counsel serves the due process
value of preserving the accuracy of the guilt-finding process.2 '
Because "truth machines" are not available, we maintain the ad-
versary system as the method best calculated to keep to a minimum
erroneous determinations of guilt. Obviously, the system contem-
plates roughly equivalent adversaries, and the only surprising
thing about Gideon v. Wainwrigt is that it was so long in coming.
However, at the police interrogation stage, the reliability preserv-
ative has traditionally been the confessions rule. Absent a con-
sideration of the privilege, the argument that effective representation
250 It has been suggested that Escobedo may be limited to in-custody interrogation
thereby encouraging pre-arrest interrogation "which would ordinarily be free of the
evil of coercion, and might enable the police to gather much of the evidence they now
obtain at the police station, without subjecting the witness to the stigma and incon-
venience of arrest." "The Supreme Court, 1963 Term," 78 Harv. L. Rev. 143, 223
(1964). There is evidence that pre-arrest interrogation is effective. See Kamisar,
"On the Tactics of Police-Prosecution Oriented Critics of the Courts," 49 Cornell
L. Q. 436, 451-52 (1964). However, if the inconsistency referred to in the text
above is an important part of the rationale of Escobedo, the distinction between pre-
arrest and post-arrest interrogation is irrelevant. In either case, effective pre-trial
interrogation would make it impossible for counsel effectively to preserve the privilege
against self-incrimination at trial.
251 On the accuracy of the guilt-finding proocess as a due process value, see
Kadish, "Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication: A Survey and
Criticism," 66 Yale L.J. 319 (1957). I do not mean to suggest that the presence of
counsel preserves no other due process values. To the contrary it is clear that the
presence of counsel at trial preserves, for example, the values underlying the Mapp
exclusionary rule. See Kamisar, "The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment: A Dialogue on 'the Most Pervasive Right' of an Accused," 30 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1, 21-26 (1962). However, the privilege against self-incrimination aside, the preser-
vation of such values at trial does not require the presence of counsel at the police
interrogation.
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at trial requires the presence of counsel at the interrogation stage
must be based on one of two assumptions: that effective repre-
sentation at trial means winning, or that the presence of counsel
at interrogation in some way increases the reliability of the
guilt-determining process. The first assumption must be rejected
as without constitutional or other basis. The second assumption
may or may not be true. Mr. Justice Jackson observed in Watts v.
Indiana that "any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no
uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any circum-
stances." 252 Advice regarding the privilege will frustrate inquiry
and, in many cases, will detract from the reliability of the guilt-
determining process. On the other hand, if the interrogee does
submit to interrogation, the presence of counsel is a substantial
hedge against pressure, unfair questions, and inaccuracies in either
the recording or recollection of oral statements. Moreover, the
presence of any third party at the interrogation minimizes the
credibility problem that arises when the defendant's claim of
coercion is resisted by the testimony of the interrogator that no
pressure was used. In short, whether the presence of counsel at the
interrogation enhances accuracy or reliability will depend upon the
facts of a particular case, upon the details of what happened at the
interrogation. Consequently, insistence upon the presence of coun-
sel in all cases is simply an insistence upon the barrier to confession
imposed by an effective privilege against self-incrimination, and a
root-and-branch rejection of all confessions that are not volunteered.
Why should the Court reject such confessions? One possible answer
is indicated in Escobedo:
We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern, that
a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on
the 'confession' will, in the long run, be less reliable and more
subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic
evidence independently secured through skillful investigation. 25 3
Abusive police conduct does exist to some extent,254 but the
extent is difficult to determine. If one theme runs through the
coerced confession cases, it is that the Court does not know what
happened at the police station. 2"5 The defendant claims that he was
beaten or threatened or was promised some benefit. All of these
claims are denied by the police. A reviewing court, faced with a
252 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (concurring opinion).
253 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1964).
254 See Houts, From Arrest to Release 76-77 (1958); Trebach, The Rationing
of Justice 41-46 (1964).
255 See Douglas, "The Means and the End," 1959 Wash, U.L.Q. 103, 114.
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finding of fact against coercion, is forced to speculate, to state that
thirty-six hours of interrogation are "inherently coercive," 256 and
to insist that "the effect of such massive official interrogation must
have been felt." 257 The blame lies not with judges. They know
that abusive practices exist and they also know that abuse seldom
appears clearly from the record. The blame lies not with the de-
fendant. He is forced to rely on his own testimony because no
third party was permitted to attend -the interrogation. The blame
does lie with the police. For years, the police have insisted that
productive interrogation can take place only in private and that
an interrogee will not confess if he is aware of the presence of third
persons.25 8 In practice, privacy has become secrecy,2 "59 and the
details of the interrogation are almost always in doubt. Steps could
have been taken to maintain privacy but to avoid secrecy. The
presence of a third person, unobserved, could have been provided
for,260 but the police did not do so, and legislatures did not under-
take effective control. It was not that control was impossible. The
relevant literature is full of such suggestions as substituting a ju-
dicial interrogation for the police interrogation; 2 1 providing that
police interrogation take place within time limits and only after
preliminary examination; 2 2 and requiring that all interrogations be
filmed.265 In the absence of legislatively prescribed controls, the
burden fell on the courts. Because due process was involved, the
Supreme Court was drawn into the picture only to be frustrated
by the problem of proof under the confessions rule. The solutions
available to legislature were not directly available to the Court,264
256 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944).
257 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 322 (1959).
258 Inbau & Reid, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions 1 (1962); Inbau,
"Police Interrogation-A Practical Necessity," in Police Power and Individual Free-
dom 147, 148-49 (Sowle ed. 1962).
259 Weisberg, supra note 244, passim.
260 If there is a risk that secrecy will gore the policeman's ox, he knows how to
avoid it: "[I]n cases where a female is the subject, a policewoman or other female
may be stationed in the observation room to witness [through a two-way mirror]
the proceedings as a safeguard against possible false accusations of misconduct on
the part of the interrogator." Inbau & Reid, op. cit. supra note 258, at 9.
261 Kauper, "Judicial Examination of the Accused-A Remedy for the Third
Degree," 30 Mich. L. Rev. 1224 (1932); Pound, "Legal Interrogation of Persons
Accused or Suspected of Crime," 24 J. Crim. L. 1014 (1934).
262 Comment, 68 Yale L.J. 1003, 1031-37 (1958).
263 Weisberg, supra note 244, at 180. In cases of drunken driving, some police
departments use motion pictures as evidence of intoxication. Time, Nov. 22, 1963, p. 61.
264 In his dissenting opinion in Escobedo, Mr. Justice White complained that
the Court had performed a legislative function. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,
498 (1964). In a recent article, it is argued that the confession problem should have
been resolved by means less drastic than the rules of Escobedo and Massialh, and it is
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but the Court was not without its weapons. Regarding federal
procedure, the Court, as a supervisory matter, fashioned the Mal-
lory exclusionary rule, the purpose of which was to solve the prob-
lem of proof by the blunt tool of minimizing, if not putting to an
end, the opportunity for interrogation.2 5 The states, however, not
bound by Mallory,260 refused to attach exclusionary rules to their
own "prompt arraignment" statutes.267 The state cases, therefore,
continued to be governed by the confessions rule with all of its
attendant weaknesses. Ultimately, the Court, in Escobedo, found
that it was forced to circumscribe state interrogation as it had been
forced to circumscribe federal interrogation in Mallory,268 and, as
in Mallory, the Court used a necessarily blunt device: the privilege
against self-incrimination made effective by the required presence
of counsel. The result is that the Court will no longer be forced to
guess whether a confession is "voluntary" or "involuntary" under
the confessions rule. Unless a confession is obtained under circum-
stances consistent with an effective privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, it is inadmissible even if "voluntary." The result may well be
undesirable, but the police (by their insistence on secrecy), the
state legislatures (by their failure to act effectively), and the state
courts (by their failure to give meaning to prompt arraignment
statutes) have brought it on themselves.
In his dissenting opinion in Escobedo, Mr. Justice White
stated:
I do not suggest for a moment that law enforcement will be
destroyed by the rule announced today. The need for peace and
order is too insistent for that. But it will be crippled and its task
made a great deal more difficult, all in my opinion, for unsound,
unstated reasons, which can find no home in any of the provisions
of the Constitution. -69
suggested that the Court should have given constitutional dimension to the Mallory
rule. Enker & Elsen, "Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo
v. Illinois," 49 Minn. L. Rev. 47, 49, 85-91 (1964).
206Y Kamisar & Choper, "The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field
Findings and Legal-Policy Observations," 48 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 46 (1963).
266 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 600-1 (1961).
267 Kamisar & Choper, supra note 265, at 44. Regarding judicial adoption of
the Mallory rule in Michigan, compare People v. Harper, 365 Mich. 494, 113 N.W.2d
808 (1962), with People v. Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410, 102 N.W2d 738 (1960).
268 I do not mean to suggest that the Escobedo rule does not apply to federal
interrogations. Clearly it does. If the interrogation occurs during a period of reason-
able delay, only Escobedo is applicable. If the interrogation occurs during a period
of unreasonable delay, presumably both Escobedo and Mallory apply. However, if,
during a period of unreasonable delay, a confession is obtained under circumstances
that accord with the Escobedo rule, a strong argument can be made that Mallory
should not apply and that the confession should be admissible.
269 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 499 (1964).
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However, there may be a way out. Even assuming the broadest
interpretation of Escobedo, the Court might approve less restrictive
procedures if delineated by state legislation, enforced by state
courts, and adhered to by state police. For this approach to be
successful, however, it will be necessary to distinguish the operation
of the privilege against self-incrimination at the police station from
its operation in other proceedings. As matters now stand, an effec-
tive privilege against self-incrimination is an insuperable barrier to
interrogation, and our crucial question is this: how effective a
privilege can we afford? 270
270 This question raises another: what do we lose by an effective privilege?
The answer is that in many cases we lose confessions and that in some of those
cases we lose convictions because some cases cannot be solved without a confession.
Assuming that obtaining convictions is not only a relevant criterion but also an im-
portant one, the critical questions are these: (1) how many cases cannot be solved
without confessions; (2) what offenses do they involve; (3) how community-
disturbing are these offenses; (4) how community-disturbing is the absence of a
solution; and (5) what is the risk that the offender wil commit similar offenses?
The general question of the extent to which we can afford safeguards in criminal
procedure has been asked already in the context of the Mallory rule. Professor Inbau
has argued that the Mallory rule is a significant impediment. Inbau, "Police Interro-
gation-A Practical Necessity," in Police Power and Individual Freedom 147, 151
(Sowle ed. 1962). Professor Kamisar, on the other hand, has urged that the evidence
does not support such a claim. Kamisar, "On the Tactics of Police-Prosecution
Oriented Critics of the Courts," 49 Cornell L.Q. 436 (1964) ; Kamisar, "Public Safety
v. Individual Liberties: Some 'Facts' and 'Theories,"' 53 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 171,
190-93 (1962). Neither argument focuses specifically on the questions raised above.
Until our methods of obtaining data are much improved, these questions can be
answered only by dogma, and whichever side bears the burden of proof will lose.
However, even in the absence of relevant data, it is not in inappropriate to recall the
following observation:
Crime, as well as other human behavior, is a function both of the number of
persons involved and their proximity to each other. This is probably the most
difficult single problem with which law enforcement must deal....
[T]he war against crime does not lie on [the] front (of returning to
law enforcement agencies powers taken from them by recent decisions].
Prosecution procedure has, at most, only the most remote causal connection
with crime. Changes in court decisions and prosecution procedure would
have about the same effect on the crime rate as an aspirin would have on a
tumor of the brain.
Address by David C. Acheson, United States Attorney for the District of Columbia,
Central Eastern Area Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board Semi-Annual Meet-
ing, October 15, 1964.
STUDENT SYMPOSIUM: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or things to be seized.
